Measuring the effect of arbitration on wage levels: The case of police officers
AbstractThe authors empirically evaluate how the provision of an arbitration statute affects police officers' wages by comparing wage levels across political jurisdictions and over time using a sample of states. Two complementary data sources are used: panel data for the years 1961-92 on state-level wages of police officers, and individual-level data on police officers from the 1970, 1980, and 1990 Decennial Censuses. The empirical results from both data sets are remarkably consistent and provide no robust evidence that the presence of arbitration statutes systematically affected overall wage levels. On average, the effect of arbitration was approximately zero, although the authors find substantial heterogeneity in the estimated effects across states. (Author's abstract.)
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School in its journal ILR Review.
Volume (Year): 54 (2001)
Issue (Month): 2 (January)
Postal: 381 Ives East, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853-3901
Other versions of this item:
- Orley Ashenfelter & Dean Hyslop, 1999. "Measuring the Effects of Arbitration on Wage Levels: The Case of Police Officers," NBER Working Papers 7294, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Orley Ashenfelter & Dean Hyslop, 1999. "Measuring the Effect of Arbitration on Wage Levels: The Case of Police Officers," Working Papers 800, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
- N80 - Economic History - - Micro-Business History - - - General, International, or Comparative
- N81 - Economic History - - Micro-Business History - - - U.S.; Canada: Pre-1913
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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- Ichniowski, Casey & Freeman, Richard Barry & Lauer, Harrison, 1989.
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4631949, Harvard University Department of Economics.
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"Unionism Comes to the Public Sector,"
Journal of Economic Literature,
American Economic Association, vol. 24(1), pages 41-86, March.
- John H. Tyler & Jeffrey R. Kling, 2004.
"Prison-Based Education And Re-Entry Into The Mainstream Labor Market,"
2004-10, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- John H. Tyler & Jeffrey R. Kling, 2006. "Prison-Based Education and Re-Entry into the Mainstream Labor Market," NBER Working Papers 12114, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Jeffrey R. Kling & John H. Tyler, 2004. "Prison-Based Education and Re-Entry into the Mainstream Labor Market," Working Papers 868, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
- John H. Tyler & Jeffrey R. Kling, 2004. "Prison-Based Education And Re-Entry Into The Mainstream Labor Market," Working Papers 12, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
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