Inflation stabilization and the vanishing size-wage effect
AbstractThe author examines wage patterns under an incomes policy in Mexico in 1987-94. The policy specified increases in the minimum wage rate, but also guided salary negotiations more generally. The author finds indications of a substantial but largely temporary effect on wage rates, and evidence consistent with more intensive monitoring of compliance in large firms than in smaller ones. For example, three years after policy implementation, public sector wages had fallen approximately 10% relative to private sector wages, and wages in the largest private firms had fallen 15% relative to those in the smallest private firms. These relative wage effects are consistent with the centralized administration of the policy. (Abstract courtesy JSTOR.)
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School in its journal ILR Review.
Volume (Year): 53 (1999)
Issue (Month): 1 (October)
Postal: 381 Ives East, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853-3901
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- Fairris, David & Popli, Gurleen & Zepeda, Eduardo, 2006. "Minimum wages and wage structure in Mexico," MPRA Paper 400, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 2006.
- Gordon H. Hanson, 2003. "What Has Happened to Wages in Mexico since NAFTA?," NBER Working Papers 9563, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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