The viability of employee-owned firms: Evidence from France
AbstractThis study examines data on French producer cooperatives for the years 1970-79 to test the widely accepted theoretical prediction that employee-owned firms either will fail as commercial undertakings or degenerate into capitalist firms as the proportion of hired workers who are not members of the cooperative firm increases. Contrary to this prediction, the authors find a high rate of survival among the producer cooperatives studied, with many cooperatives still healthy after fifty years of operation, and they find no evidence of degeneration-either in terms of the proportion of hired workers, productivity, profitability, or capital-intensity. The findings do, however, suggest that the firms' financial structure became increasingly inefficient with age. (Abstract courtesy JSTOR.)
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School in its journal ILR Review.
Volume (Year): 45 (1992)
Issue (Month): 2 (January)
Postal: 381 Ives East, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853-3901
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- Douglas Kruse & Richard Freeman & Joseph Blasi, 2008.
"Do Workers Gain by Sharing? Employee Outcomes under Employee Ownership, Profit Sharing, and Broad-based Stock Options,"
NBER Working Papers
14233, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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- Joseph R. Blasi & Richard B. Freeman & Chris Mackin & Douglas L. Kruse, 2008.
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14230, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Joseph R. Blasi & Richard B. Freeman & Christopher Mackin & Douglas L. Kruse, 2010. "Creating a Bigger Pie? The Effects of Employee Ownership, Profit Sharing, and Stock Options on Workplace Performance," NBER Chapters, in: Shared Capitalism at Work: Employee Ownership, Profit and Gain Sharing, and Broad-based Stock Options, pages 139-165 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Fathi Fakhfakh & Virginie Pérotin & Monica Gago, 2012. "Productivity, Capital, and Labor in Labor-Managed and Conventional Firms in France," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 65(4), pages 847-879, October.
- Francesca Gagliardi, 2009. "Financial development and the growth of cooperative firms," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 32(4), pages 439-464, April.
- Derek C. Jones & Panu Kalmi, 2012. "Economies of Scale Versus Participation: a Co-operative Dilemma?," Journal of Entrepreneurial and Organizational Diversity, European Research Institute on Cooperative and Social Enterprises, vol. 1(1), pages 37-64, December.
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