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The evolution of unjust-dismissal legislation in the United States

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Author Info
Alan B. Krueger

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Abstract

In the past decade, many state courts have ruled in favor of employees alleging they were improperly dismissed. The author of this paper advances an evolutionary theory of unjust-dismissal legislation in which employer groups, responding to the threat of large and variable damage awards imposed by the judicial system, eventually support unjust-dismissal legislation in order to clearly define property rights, reduce uncertainty, and limit employer liability. Based on evidence from a case study of legislation enacted in Montana and an empirical analysis of the determinants of proposed unjust-dismissal legislation in a panel of states, the author concludes that proposals of unjust-dismissal legislation are a response to court rulings that weaken and obfuscate the employer's right to dismiss employees at will. (Abstract courtesy JSTOR.)

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Publisher Info
Article provided by ILR Review, ILR School, Cornell University in its journal ILR Review.

Volume (Year): 44 (1991)
Issue (Month): 4 (July)
Pages: 644-660
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Handle: RePEc:ilr:articl:v:44:y:1991:i:4:p:644-660

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  1. James B. Rebitzer & Michael D. Robinson, 1991. "Employer Size and Dual Labor Markets," NBER Working Papers 3587, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Damiani, Mirella & Pompei, Fabrizio, 2009. "Labour protection and productivity in the European economies: 1995-2005," MPRA Paper 12710, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  4. Malo, M.A aand Joaquin Pérez., 2002. "Individual dismissals in Europe and the United States: A model on the influence of the legal framework on firing costs," Doctorado en Economía- documentos de trabajo 9/02, Programa de doctorado en Economía. Universidad de Alcalá.. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Andrew Weiss & Ruqu Wang, 1990. "A Sorting Model of Labor Contracts: Implications for Layoffs and Wage-Tenure Profiles," NBER Working Papers 3448, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Kyota Eguchi, 2000. "Employment Protection Regulations and New Hiring," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-88, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
  7. Kugler, Adriana D. & Saint-Paul, Gilles, 2000. "Hiring and Firing Costs, Adverse Selection and Long-term Unemployment," IZA Discussion Papers 134, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
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  8. Andrea Ichino & Gerd Muehlheusser, 2003. "How often should you open the door? Optimal monitoring to screen heterogeneous agents," Diskussionsschriften dp0319, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft. [Downloadable!]
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  9. John T. Addison, 2006. "Politico-Economic Causes of Labor Regulation in the United States: Rent Seeking, Alliances, Raising Rivals’ Costs (Even Lowering One’s Own?), and Interjurisdictional Competition," IZA Discussion Papers 2381, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  10. James B. Rebitzer & Lowell J. Taylor, 1991. "Work Incentives and the Demand for Primary and Contingent Labor," NBER Working Papers 3647, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Susan N. Houseman, 2000. "Why Employers Use Flexible Staffing Arrangements: Evidence from an Establishment Survey," Staff Working Papers 01-67, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. W. Bentley MacLeod & Voraprapa Nakavachara, 2006. "Legal Default Rules: The Case of Wrongful Discharge Laws," IZA Discussion Papers 1970, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
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  13. David H. Autor & John J. Donohue III & Stewart J. Schwab, 2003. "The Costs of Wrongful-Discharge Laws," NBER Working Papers 9425, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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