The impact on absenteeism and quits of profit-sharing and other forms of employee participation
AbstractUsing data on 52 engineering and metal working firms in the United Kingdom in 1983-84, the authors of this study investigate how employee participation affects absenteeism and quit rates. Included in the explanatory model are measures of union presence, formal schemes for employee involvement in decision-making, employees' perceived participation in decision-making (based on interviews), and the extent of employee financial participation through profit-sharing, share ownership, and fringe benefits. The results indicate that firms with participation schemes had significantly lower average absenteeism and quit rates than firms without such schemes. (Abstract courtesy JSTOR.)
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School in its journal ILR Review.
Volume (Year): 44 (1991)
Issue (Month): 3 (April)
Postal: 381 Ives East, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853-3901
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Pouliakas, Konstantinos & Theodoropoulos, Nikolaos, 2011. "The Effect of Variable Pay Schemes on Workplace Absenteeism," IZA Discussion Papers 5941, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- García-Serrano, Carlos & Malo, Miguel A., 2009. "The impact of union direct voice on voluntary and involuntary absenteeism," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 372-383, March.
- Patrice Laroche & Mathieu Floquet & Loris Guery & Chloé Guillot-Soulez & Anne Stévenot, 2013. "Les Relations Entre Epargne Salariale Et Remunerations : Une Analyse Des Strategies Et De La Coherence Des Pratiques," Post-Print halshs-00863544, HAL.
- Tetsuji Okazaki, 2005.
""Voice" and "Exit" in Japanese Firms during the Second World War: Sanpo Revisited,"
CIRJE-F-345, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Tetsuji Okazaki, 2003. ""Voice" and "Exit" in Japanese Firms during the Second World War: Sanpo Revisited," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-243, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Georges Dionne & Benoit Dostie, 2007.
"New Evidence on the Determinants of Absenteeism Using Linked Employer-Employee Data,"
Industrial and Labor Relations Review,
ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 61(1), pages 108-120, October.
- Georges Dionne & Benoit Dostie, 2005. "New Evidence on the Determinants of Absenteeism Using Linked Employer-Employee Data," Cahiers de recherche 0521, CIRPEE.
- Georges Dionne & Benoit Dostie, 2005. "New Evidence on the Determinants of Absenteeism Using Linked Employer-Employee Data," Cahiers de recherche 05-04, HEC Montréal, Institut d'économie appliquée.
- C Green & J S Heywood, 2007. "Does profit sharing increase training by reducing turnover?," Working Papers 589032, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.
- repec:nbr:nberwo:14233 is not listed on IDEAS
- Hassink, Wolter & Koning, Pierre, 2005.
"Do Financial Bonuses to Employees Reduce Their Absenteeism? Outcome of a Lottery,"
IZA Discussion Papers
1644, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Wolter Hassink & Pierre Koning, 2005. "Do Financial Bonuses to Employees Reduce their Absenteeism? Outcome of a Lottery," Working Papers 05-27, Utrecht School of Economics.
- Joseph R. Blasi & Richard B. Freeman & Christopher Mackin & Douglas L. Kruse, 2010. "Creating a Bigger Pie? The Effects of Employee Ownership, Profit Sharing, and Stock Options on Workplace Performance," NBER Chapters, in: Shared Capitalism at Work: Employee Ownership, Profit and Gain Sharing, and Broad-based Stock Options, pages 139-165 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Pouliakas, Konstantinos & Theodoropoulos, Nikolaos, 2009. "Performance Pay as an Incentive for Lower Absence Rates in Britain," MPRA Paper 18238, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Fumio Ohtake, 2003. "Unions, the Costs of Job Loss, and Vacation," NBER Chapters, in: Labor Markets and Firm Benefit Policies in Japan and the United States, pages 371-390 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Pouliakas, Konstantinos & Theodossiou, Ioannis, 2010.
"An Inquiry Into The Theory, Causes And Consequences Of Monitoring Indicators Of Health And Safety At Work,"
SIRE Discussion Papers
2010-120, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
- Pouliakas, Konstantinos & Theodossiou, Ioannis, 2010. "An Inquiry into the Theory, Causes and Consequences of Monitoring Indicators of Health and Safety at Work," IZA Discussion Papers 4734, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Konstantinos, Pouliakas & Ioannis, Theodossiou, 2010. "An Inquiry Into the Theory, Causes and Consequences of Monitoring Indicators of Health and Safety At Work," MPRA Paper 20336, University Library of Munich, Germany.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (ILR Review).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.