This paper presents a numerical simulation, based on data from the early 1970s, to investigate the economic links between labor market outcomes and the workers' compensation insurance system. The results suggest that, in most cases, any of three changes in the system-more generous benefits, more accurate categorization of insurance claims, or more complete experience rating of premiums-will slightly reduce the actual number of work-related injuries but will dramatically increase the number of insurance claims filed. The authors conclude that changes in self-reported injuries can produce significant misimpressions of the safety incentives created by the workers' compensation insurance system. (Abstract courtesy JSTOR.)
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Article provided by ILR Review, ILR School, Cornell University in its journal ILR Review.
Volume (Year): 42 (1989) Issue (Month): 2 (January) Pages: 280-293 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML,
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