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Determinants of the compensation and mobility of school superintendents

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Author Info
Ronald G. Ehrenberg
Ronald A. Ehrenberg
Richard P. Chaykowski

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Abstract

Analyzing 1978-83 panel data from more than 700 New York State school districts, the authors find evidence that school superintendents were rewarded, both by higher salary increases and by enhanced opportunities to move to better-paying jobs, for having low school tax rates and high educational achievement within their districts, relative to the values of those variables in comparable school districts in the state. The rewards were, however, quite small. The analysis also suggests that the superintendents themselves did not significantly influence either school tax rates or educational test scores in their districts. (Abstract courtesy JSTOR.)

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Publisher Info
Article provided by ILR Review, ILR School, Cornell University in its journal ILR Review.

Volume (Year): 41 (1988)
Issue (Month): 3 (April)
Pages: 386-401
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Handle: RePEc:ilr:articl:v:41:y:1988:i:3:p:386-401

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  1. Sherrilyn M. Billger, 2007. "Principals as Agents? Investigating Accountability in the Compensation and Performance of School Principals," IZA Discussion Papers 2662, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Ronald G. Ehrenberg & Randy A. Ehrenberg & Daniel I. Rees & Eric L. Ehrenberg, 1991. "School District Leave Policies, Teacher Absenteeism, and Student Achievement," NBER Working Papers 2874, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2009-12-14.


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