Determinants of the compensation and mobility of school superintendents
AbstractAnalyzing 1978-83 panel data from more than 700 New York State school districts, the authors find evidence that school superintendents were rewarded, both by higher salary increases and by enhanced opportunities to move to better-paying jobs, for having low school tax rates and high educational achievement within their districts, relative to the values of those variables in comparable school districts in the state. The rewards were, however, quite small. The analysis also suggests that the superintendents themselves did not significantly influence either school tax rates or educational test scores in their districts. (Abstract courtesy JSTOR.)
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School in its journal ILR Review.
Volume (Year): 41 (1988)
Issue (Month): 3 (April)
Postal: 381 Ives East, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853-3901
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- Billger, Sherrilyn M., 2007.
"Principals as Agents? Investigating Accountability in the Compensation and Performance of School Principals,"
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- Ehrenberg, Ronald G. & Ehrenberg, Randy A. & Smith, Christopher L. & Zhang, Liang, 2004.
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