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The impact of attorneys and arbitrators on arbitration awards

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Author Info
Richard N. Block
Jack Stieber
Abstract

This paper analyzes the impact of attorney representation and the identity of the arbitrator on a sample of grievance arbitration awards in cases involving discharge for just cause. The results indicate that, as compared to cases in which neither side is represented by an attorney, each party has more favorable arbitration awards when it has attorney representation and the other party does not. When both sides have attorney representation, however, the awards do not differ from those given when neither side has attorney representation. The results also indicate that the awards of several of the arbitrators studied were consistently more favorable to one of the parties than the other. (Abstract courtesy JSTOR.)

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Publisher Info
Article provided by ILR Review, ILR School, Cornell University in its journal ILR Review.

Volume (Year): 40 (1987)
Issue (Month): 4 (July)
Pages: 543-555
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Handle: RePEc:ilr:articl:v:40:y:1987:i:4:p:543-555

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  1. Orley Ashenfelter & Gordon Dahl, 2003. "Strategic Bargaining Behavior, Self-Serving Biases, and the Role of Expert Agents An Empirical Study of Final-Offer Arbitration," Working Papers 857, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section.. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Orley Ashenfelter & David Bloom, 1990. "Lawyers as Agents of the Devil in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game," Working Papers 650, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section.. [Downloadable!]
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  3. repec:fth:prinin:270 is not listed on IDEAS
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