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Capitalism and kinship: Do institutions matter in the labor market?


Author Info

  • Peter B. Doeringer
  • Philip I. Moss
  • David G. Terkla


This study examines the determination of employment and pay on "capitalist" and "kinship" vessels in the New England fishing industry. Capitalist vessels resemble standard competitive firms in the way that employment and pay respond to changing market conditions; kinship vessels operate under work guarantees and income sharing rules. These differences in institutional rules lead to different patterns of income, employment, growth, and labor adjustment. The study shows how an understanding of the institutional structure of labor markets can contribute to the design of public policies to facilitate adjustment to change and to promote industrial growth. (Abstract courtesy JSTOR.)

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School in its journal ILR Review.

Volume (Year): 40 (1986)
Issue (Month): 1 (October)
Pages: 48-60

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Handle: RePEc:ilr:articl:v:40:y:1986:i:1:p:48-60

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Cited by:
  1. Yang, Chulguen & Colarelli, Stephen M. & Han, Kyunghee & Page, Robert, 2011. "Start-up and hiring practices of immigrant entrepreneurs: An empirical study from an evolutionary psychological perspective," International Business Review, Elsevier, vol. 20(6), pages 636-645.
  2. Benito Arruñada & Manuel González, 1997. "How competition controls team production: The case of fishing firms," Economics Working Papers 261, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  3. Stanley, Denise L., 2002. "Efficiency and equity tradeoffs: incentive-compatible contracts revisited," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 309-331, April.


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