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Norms of distributive justice in interest arbitration

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  • Max H. Bazerman
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    Abstract

    This study uses a simulation methodology to analyze the use of three alternative norms of distributive justice by arbitrators in conventional interest arbitration. Sixty-nine experienced arbitrators each provided decisions in 25 hypothetical wage cases in which seven factors, such as the inflation rate and the ability to pay, were systematically varied. Individually, most arbitrators were very consistent in the weights they gave to these seven factors in their decisions across cases, but arbitrators differed significantly among themselves in the weight assigned each factor. Also, arbitrators' subjective assessments of their weighting policies often differed from their actual weighting practices. The most common norm followed by these arbitrators was "anchored equity": maintaining the status quo by adjusting the present wage by the average negotiated increase in the industry. (Abstract courtesy JSTOR.)

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School in its journal ILR Review.

    Volume (Year): 38 (1985)
    Issue (Month): 4 (July)
    Pages: 558-570

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    Handle: RePEc:ilr:articl:v:38:y:1985:i:4:p:558-570

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    Cited by:
    1. Simon G�chter & Arno Riedl, 2003. "Moral Property Rights in Bargaining with Infeasible Claims," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 03-055/1, Tinbergen Institute.
    2. repec:fth:prinin:296 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Henry S. Farber & Max H. Bazerman, 1989. "Divergent Expectations as a Cause of Disagreement in Bargaining: Evidence from a Comparison of Arbitration Schemes."," NBER Working Papers 2139, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. David G. Blanchflower & Andrew J. Oswald & Peter Sanfey, 1992. "Wages, Profits and Rent-Sharing," NBER Working Papers 4222, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Simon Gächter & Arno Riedl, . "Moral Property Rights in Bargaining," IEW - Working Papers 113, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    6. Simon Gächter & Arno Riedl, 2005. "Moral Property Rights in Bargaining with Infeasible Claims," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 51(2), pages 249-263, February.
    7. James Konow, 2003. "Which Is the Fairest One of All? A Positive Analysis of Justice Theories," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 41(4), pages 1188-1239, December.
    8. repec:fth:prinin:284 is not listed on IDEAS

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