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The failure to negotiate first contracts: Determinants and policy implications

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Author Info
William N. Cooke
Abstract

This study examines why unions, after winning certification rights, fail to secure agreements in roughly one of every four first-contract negotiations. Hypotheses are derived from Chamberlain's theory that the relative power of the negotiating parties is a function of the costs of agreeing and disagreeing, costs that are shaped by economic, legal, and organizational factors. The author analyzes data through 1982 on 118 cases in which unions had won NLRB elections in Indiana in the years 1979 and 1980. He finds that an employer's discrimination against union activists and his refusal to bargain, measured by section 8(a)(3) and 8(a)(5) charges deemed meritorious by the regional office of the NLRB, have substantial negative effects on the probability that a first contract will be reached. Similarly, negative effects result from lengthy delay in the NLRB's resolution of employer objections and challenges to lost elections. On the other hand, unions are also more likely to obtain first contracts when firms pay wages well above the industry average, when national union representatives participate in negotiations, and when bargaining units are relatively large and cohesive. (Abstract courtesy JSTOR.)

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Publisher Info
Article provided by ILR Review, ILR School, Cornell University in its journal ILR Review.

Volume (Year): 38 (1985)
Issue (Month): 2 (January)
Pages: 163-178
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Handle: RePEc:ilr:articl:v:38:y:1985:i:2:p:163-178

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  1. Henry S. Farber & Bruce Western, 2001. "Ronald Reagan and the Politics of Declining Union Organization," Working Papers 839, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section.. [Downloadable!]
  2. repec:fth:prinin:460 is not listed on IDEAS
  3. David Lee & Alexandre Mas, 2009. "Long-Run Impacts of Unions on Firms: New Evidence from Financial Markets, 1961-1999," NBER Working Papers 14709, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Henry S. Farber & Bruce Western, 2000. "Round Up The Usual Suspects: The Decline of Unions in The Private Sector, 1973-1998," Working Papers 816, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section.. [Downloadable!]
  5. Michael Abbott & Orley Ashenfelter, 1974. "Labor Supply, Commodity Demand, and the Allocation of Time," Working Papers 437, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section.. [Downloadable!]
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  6. repec:fth:prinin:437 is not listed on IDEAS
  7. S Johnson, 1999. "Automatic Certification or Mandatory Representation Votes? How the Choice of Union Recognition Procedure Affects Union Certification Success," ESRC Centre for Business Research - Working Papers wp139, ESRC Centre for Business Research. [Downloadable!]
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