Trade unions, absenteeism, and exit-voice
AbstractThis paper examines the effect of union membership on absenteeism. On the one hand, union members might be absent more frequently than nonmembers because they face smaller penalties for absenteeism and because managers in union plants have less flexibility to tailor work schedules to individual preferences. On the other hand, union members might be absent less frequently because of the more attractive regular work schedules and stronger employee "voice" in union plants. The evidence from three data sets, two cross-sectional and one longitudinal, indicates that, other things equal, union members are at least 29% more likely to be absent than workers who do not belong to unions. These results, together with the finding of others that job dissatisfaction is greater among union members, suggest that union voice may not be effective in influencing many aspects of the employment relationship. (Abstract courtesy JSTOR.)
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School in its journal ILR Review.
Volume (Year): 37 (1984)
Issue (Month): 3 (April)
Postal: 381 Ives East, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853-3901
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