Trade unions, absenteeism, and exit-voice
AbstractThis paper examines the effect of union membership on absenteeism. On the one hand, union members might be absent more frequently than nonmembers because they face smaller penalties for absenteeism and because managers in union plants have less flexibility to tailor work schedules to individual preferences. On the other hand, union members might be absent less frequently because of the more attractive regular work schedules and stronger employee "voice" in union plants. The evidence from three data sets, two cross-sectional and one longitudinal, indicates that, other things equal, union members are at least 29% more likely to be absent than workers who do not belong to unions. These results, together with the finding of others that job dissatisfaction is greater among union members, suggest that union voice may not be effective in influencing many aspects of the employment relationship. (Abstract courtesy JSTOR.)
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School in its journal ILR Review.
Volume (Year): 37 (1984)
Issue (Month): 3 (April)
Postal: 381 Ives East, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853-3901
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- García-Serrano, Carlos & Malo, Miguel A., 2009. "The impact of union direct voice on voluntary and involuntary absenteeism," The Journal of Socio-Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 372-383, March.
- Goldsmith, Arthur H. & Veum, Jonathan R. & Darity, William Jr., 2000. "Working hard for the money? Efficiency wages and worker effort," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 21(4), pages 351-385, August.
- Goerke, Laszlo & Pannenberg, Markus, 2012.
"Trade Union Membership and Sickness Absence: Evidence from a Sick Pay Reform,"
IZA Discussion Papers
6777, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Laszlo Goerke & Markus Pannenberg, 2012. "Trade Union Membership and Sickness Absence: Evidence from a Sick Pay Reform," CESifo Working Paper Series 3909, CESifo Group Munich.
- Laszlo Goerke & Markus Pannenberg, 2012. "Trade Union Membership and Sickness Absence: Evidence from a Sick Pay Reform," SOEPpapers on Multidisciplinary Panel Data Research 470, DIW Berlin, The German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP).
- Laszlo Goerke & Markus Pannenberg, 2012. "Trade Union Membership and Sickness Absence: Evidence from a Sick Pay Reform," IAAEU Discussion Papers 201207, Institute of Labour Law and Industrial Relations in the European Union (IAAEU).
- Heywood, John S. & Jirjahn, Uwe & Wei, Xiangdong, 2008. "Teamwork, monitoring and absence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 68(3-4), pages 676-690, December.
- Levine, David I., 1991. "You Get What You Pay For: Tests of Efficency Wage Theories in the United States and Japan," Institute for Research on Labor and Employment, Working Paper Series qt9t02v034, Institute of Industrial Relations, UC Berkeley.
- Leigh, J. Paul, 1995. "Smoking, self-selection and absenteeism," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(4), pages 365-386.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (ILR Review).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.