The macroeconomic strike model: A study of seventeen countries, 1948û1975
AbstractThis paper reports the results of an analysis of data on industrial conflict (strikes and lockouts) in seventeen OECD countries during the period 1948-75. A number of models are tested on this broad data set, including the major elements of the Ashenfeher and Johnson model. Contrary to Ashenfelter and Johnson's results for the United States, this study finds for most countries a positive relationship between the number of conflicts and the rate of increase in real wages in manufacturing. Further, the increase in nominal wages produces stronger results in all models tested than the increase in real wages; the effect of unemployment is unstable across countries; and only one of two political variables yields even modest results. The authors suggest that an explanation of their findings might be found in the relationship between changes in the wage structure and changes in the level of conflict. (Abstract courtesy JSTOR.)
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School in its journal ILR Review.
Volume (Year): 35 (1982)
Issue (Month): 4 (July)
Postal: 381 Ives East, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853-3901
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- S Milner, 1995. "Industrial Disputes and the Law in Spain," CEP Discussion Papers dp0250, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
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