Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Splitting-the-difference in interest arbitration

Contents:

Author Info

  • Henry S. Farber
Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    This study develops two models of the behavior of interest arbitrators in which the arbitrator has some exogenous notion of an equitable settlement and yet is also influenced to some extent by the positions of the parties. The author argues that it is the arbitrator's notion of an equitable outcome that determines the positions of the parties, and empirical evidence suggesting that the arbitrator merely splits the difference is misleading. In fact, the parties are likely to position themselves around the expected arbitration award, suggesting that the expected arbitration outcome shapes the parties' bargaining positions rather than the reverse. There is nevertheless some truth to the notion that an arbitrator who is sensitive to the demands of the parties can chill bargaining. The author therefore proposes that the arbitration award be made independent of actual negotiating positions through a closed-offer mechanism. (Abstract courtesy JSTOR.)

    Download Info

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School in its journal ILR Review.

    Volume (Year): 35 (1981)
    Issue (Month): 1 (October)
    Pages: 70-77

    as in new window
    Handle: RePEc:ilr:articl:v:35:y:1981:i:1:p:70-77

    Contact details of provider:
    Fax: 607-255-8016
    Web page: http://www.ilr.cornell.edu/ilrreview/
    More information through EDIRC

    Order Information:
    Postal: 381 Ives East, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853-3901
    Email:
    Web: http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/ilrreview/

    Related research

    Keywords:

    References

    No references listed on IDEAS
    You can help add them by filling out this form.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as in new window

    Cited by:
    1. Yannick Gabuthy & Nadège Marchand, 2004. "Does Resorting to Online Dispute Resolution Promote Agreements? Experimental Evidence," Working Papers, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure 0401, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure.
    2. Henry S. Farber & Max H. Bazerman, 1984. "The General Basis of Arbitrator Behavior: An Empirical Analysis of Conventional and Final-Offer Arbitration," NBER Working Papers 1488, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Max H. Bazerman & Henry S. Farber, 1983. "Arbitrator Decision Making: When Are Final Offers Important?," NBER Working Papers 1183, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Orley Ashenfelter & David E. Bloom, 1983. "Models of Arbitrator Behavior: Theory and Evidence," NBER Working Papers 1149, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. David Dickinson, 2003. "Mediation, Walrasian Tâtonnement, and Negotiations as an Exchange Economy," Working Papers, Utah State University, Department of Economics 2003-11, Utah State University, Department of Economics.
    6. repec:hal:journl:halshs-00259457 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Nicolas Jacquemet & Yannick Gabuthy, 2012. "Analyse économique du droit et méthode expérimentale," Working Papers, HAL halshs-00746617, HAL.
    8. Richard B. Freeman & Robert G. Valletta, 1987. "The Effect of Public Sector Labor laws on Collective Bargaining, Wages, and Employment," NBER Working Papers 2284, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ilr:articl:v:35:y:1981:i:1:p:70-77. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (ILR Review).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.