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On the empirical testing of the Nash-Zeuthen bargaining solution

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Author Info
Jan Svejnar

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Abstract

This paper examines several methodological problems encountered by researchers who have attempted to test the existence of the Nash-Zeuthen bargaining solution. The author attributes the problems to a misrepresentation of Nash-Zeuthen theories, weak empirical tests, and inadequate data. To help overcome these problems, he suggests two empirical strategies. (Abstract courtesy JSTOR.)

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Publisher Info
Article provided by ILR Review, ILR School, Cornell University in its journal ILR Review.

Volume (Year): 33 (1980)
Issue (Month): 4 (July)
Pages: 536-542
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Handle: RePEc:ilr:articl:v:33:y:1980:i:4:p:536-542

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  1. Pierre-André Chiappori & Olivier Donni, 2006. "Learning from a Piece of Pie: The Empirical Content of Nash Bargaining," IZA Discussion Papers 2128, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
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