The industrial organization of Congress in USA and Spain: a comparative institutional analysis
AbstractThe institutional and organizational details framing legislative processes are key aspects for understanding how Congresses work. From a new institutional economics perspective, this paper comparatively examines how the Spanish and USA Congresses are organized. The main purpose of the paper is to unveil the so-called “black box” factors operating in each case. The role played by property rights, hierarchy, individual deputies, leadership, transactions costs and committees will be researched. Whereas committees and decision-making rules based on a property rights system are key factors for understanding how the Congress performs in USA; in the Spanish case the most relevant explanatory factors are strong party leadership and the hierarchical rules by which political parties and parlamentary groups are organized.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Ilades-Georgetown University, Economics Department in its journal Revista de Analisis Economico.
Volume (Year): 21 (2006)
Issue (Month): 2 (December)
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
- P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism
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- North, D.C., 1990. "A Transaction Cost Theory of Politics," Papers 144, Washington St. Louis - School of Business and Political Economy.
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- Toboso, Fernando & Compés, Raúl, 2003. "Nuevas tendencias analíticas en el ámbito de la nueva economía institucional. La incorporación de los aspectos distributivos," El Trimestre Económico, Fondo de Cultura Económica, vol. 0(280), pages 637-671, octubre-d.
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