Tarificación de la Transmisión Eléctrica: por qué licitar es (mucho) mejor que regular
AbstractThere are at least two ways of fixing high voltage transmission tolls. One is to regulate them in standard fashion; another is to allocate new transmission lines in competitive auctions to the bidder offering the lowest toll. In this paper we show that expected tolls are considerably lower if lines are auctioned. Auctions dominate regulation for three reasons. First, bidder competition ensures lower expected tolls. Second, they increase the regulator's bargaining power. Third, if, as in Argentina, project users are allowed to bid and build the line, they can induce even more intense competition. We use our theoretical model to analyze the auction for the fourth Comahue line in Argentina. We show that, had the toll been regulated, it would have been at least 61% higher.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Ilades-Georgetown University, Universidad Alberto Hurtado/School of Economics and Bussines in its journal Revista de Analisis Economico.
Volume (Year): 19 (2004)
Issue (Month): 1 (June)
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L52 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Industrial Policy; Sectoral Planning Methods
- L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities
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