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The Effects of Bank Capital on Lending: What Do We Know, and What Does It Mean?

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  • Douglas Gale

    (New York University)

Abstract

Capital requirements are the principal tool of macroprudential regulation of banks. Bank capital serves both as a buffer and as a disincentive to excessive risk taking. When general equilibrium effects are taken into account, however, it is not clear that higher capital requirements will reduce the level of risk in the banking system. In addition, an increase in the required capital ratio can force banks to take on more risk in order to achieve target rates of return.

Suggested Citation

  • Douglas Gale, 2010. "The Effects of Bank Capital on Lending: What Do We Know, and What Does It Mean?," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 6(34), pages 187-204, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:ijc:ijcjou:y:2010:q:4:a:9
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Mr. Gianni De Nicolo & Marcella Lucchetta, 2009. "Financial Intermediation, Competition, and Risk: A General Equilibrium Exposition," IMF Working Papers 2009/105, International Monetary Fund.
    2. Di Nicolo, G. & Lucchetta, M., 2010. "Financial Intermediation, Competition, and Risk : A General Equilibrium Exposition," Discussion Paper 2010-67S, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
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    Cited by:

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    2. Hari Gopal Risal & Suprima Poudel, 2020. "Role of Credit Risk in Performance difference between A and B Class Banks in Nepal," NRB Economic Review, Nepal Rastra Bank, Economic Research Department, vol. 32(1), pages 37-53, April.
    3. Dominika Ehrenbergerová & Martin Hodula & Zuzana Gric, 2022. "Does capital-based regulation affect bank pricing policy?," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 61(2), pages 135-167, April.
    4. Ivana Catturani & Erika Dalpiaz, 2017. "Alternative classifications of Italian banks:Do different grouping rules mislead results on the risk profile of banks?," DEM Working Papers 2017/11, Department of Economics and Management.
    5. José-Luis Peydró & Andrea Polo & Enrico Sette & Victoria Vanasco, 2020. "Risk Mitigating versus Risk Shifting: Evidence from Banks Security Trading in Crises," Working Papers 1219, Barcelona School of Economics.
    6. Tirupam Goel & Isha Agarwal, 2021. "Limits of stress-test based bank regulation," BIS Working Papers 953, Bank for International Settlements.
    7. Hari Gopal Risal & Sabin Bikram Panta, 2019. "CAMELS-Based Supervision and Risk Management: What Works and What Does Not," FIIB Business Review, , vol. 8(3), pages 194-204, September.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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