Offshore Bidding and Currency Futures
AbstractIn an interactive model of offshore bidding, two firms located in two different countries bid on a project in a third country under exchange rate uncertainty. Every firm benefits and provides a higher bid when both firms have hedging opportunities. Even if only one bidder has the hedging opportunity, both bidders gain through an increase in their expected utilities.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by College of Business, and College of Finance, Feng Chia University, Taichung, Taiwan in its journal International Journal of Business and Economics.
Volume (Year): 7 (2008)
Issue (Month): 2 (August)
exchange rate; futures markets; uncertainty; game theory; multinational enterprise;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- F3 - International Economics - - International Finance
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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