On the Ideology Motive in Political Economy Models
AbstractThis note provides a simple political economy model which captures the trade-off of political parties between catering to their "core" constituency and appealing to middle-of-the-road voters, who are not intrinsically attached to a party. The analysis reconciles seemingly ideology-motivated behavior of political parties with vote-maximization.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by College of Business, and College of Finance, Feng Chia University, Taichung, Taiwan in its journal International Journal of Business and Economics.
Volume (Year): 5 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
ideological polarization; partisan constituency; political parties;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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