Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Terrorism And Cabinet Duration

Contents:

Author Info

  • Martin Gassebner
  • Richard Jong‐A‐Pin
  • Jochen O. Mierau

Abstract

We examine the relationship between terrorism and cabinet duration. Our data set includes more than 2,400 cabinets in over 150 countries in the period 1968-2002. We find a small, but significant effect of terrorism on the probability of government failure. Furthermore, we find that the impact of terrorism depends on the type of attack and is larger in case of more severe attacks. Marginal effect calculations show that the impact of terror on cabinet duration is larger than the impact of economic variables such as economic growth, but less than the impact of a civil war or a government crisis. Our results suggest that cabinets in countries with high levels of terrorism are particularly vulnerable to terrorist attacks.

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/j.1468-2354.2011.00666.x
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association in its journal International Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 52 (2011)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
Pages: 1253-1270

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:52:y:2011:i:4:p:1253-1270

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 160 McNeil Building, 3718 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297
Phone: (215) 898-8487
Fax: (215) 573-2057
Email:
Web page: http://www.econ.upenn.edu/ier
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Email:
Web: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/subs.asp?ref=0020-6598

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, 2009. "Democratic Capital: The Nexus of Political and Economic Change," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 1(2), pages 88-126, July.
  2. Beck, Thorsten & Clarke, George & Groff, Alberto & Keefer, Philip & Walsh, Patrick, 2000. "New tools and new tests in comparative political economy - the database of political institutions," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2283, The World Bank.
  3. Enders, Walter & Sandler, Todd & Parise, Gerald F, 1992. "An Econometric Analysis of the Impact of Terrorism on Tourism," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(4), pages 531-54.
  4. Blomberg, S. Brock & Hess, Gregory D. & Orphanides, Athanasios, 2004. "The macroeconomic consequences of terrorism," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(5), pages 1007-1032, July.
  5. Carmignani, Fabrizio, 2002. "New Evidence on the Politics and Economics of Multiparty Cabinets Duration," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 49(3), pages 249-79, August.
  6. J. A. Hausman, 1976. "Specification Tests in Econometrics," Working papers 185, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  7. Gassebner, Martin & Jong-A-Pin, Richard & Mierau, Jochen O., 2008. "Terrorism and electoral accountability: One strike, you're out!," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 100(1), pages 126-129, July.
  8. John Ferejohn, 1986. "Incumbent performance and electoral control," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 50(1), pages 5-25, January.
  9. Axel Dreher & Bernhard Herz & Volker Karb, 2006. "Is there a causal link between currency and debt crises?," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 11(4), pages 305-325.
  10. Bruno S. Frey & Simon Luechinger & Alois Stutzer, 2004. "Valuing Public Goods: The Life Satisfaction Approach," CREMA Working Paper Series 2004-11, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
  11. Bruno S. Frey & Simon Luechinger & Alois Stutzer, 2004. "Calculating Tragedy: Assessing the Costs of Terrorism," CREMA Working Paper Series 2004-23, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
  12. Tavares, Jose, 2004. "The open society assesses its enemies: shocks, disasters and terrorist attacks," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(5), pages 1039-1070, July.
  13. Chamberlain, Gary, 1980. "Analysis of Covariance with Qualitative Data," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(1), pages 225-38, January.
  14. Siqueira, Kevin & Sandler, Todd, 2007. "Terrorist backlash, terrorism mitigation, and policy delegation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(9), pages 1800-1815, September.
  15. Charles Anderton & John Carter, 2005. "On Rational Choice Theory And The Study Of Terrorism," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 16(4), pages 275-282.
  16. Fielding, David, 2003. " Counting the Cost of the Intifada: Consumption, Saving and Political Instability in Israel," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 116(3-4), pages 297-312, September.
  17. Kiefer, Nicholas M, 1988. "Economic Duration Data and Hazard Functions," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 26(2), pages 646-79, June.
  18. Beck, T.H.L. & Clarke, G. & Groff, A. & Keefer , P. & Walsh, P., 2001. "New tools in comparative political economy: The database of political institutions," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-3125517, Tilburg University.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Axel Dreher & Justina A.V. Fischer, 2008. "Decentralization as a disincentive for transnational terror? An empirical test," University of St. Gallen Department of Economics working paper series 2008 2008-01, Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen.
  2. Axel Dreher & Justina A. V. Fischer, 2009. "Government decentralization as a disincentive for transnational terror? An empirical analysis," Diskussionspapiere aus dem Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universität Hohenheim 313/2009, Department of Economics, University of Hohenheim, Germany.
  3. Axel Dreher & Nathan Jensen, 2009. "Country or Leader? Political Change and UN General Assembly Voting," KOF Working papers 09-217, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich.
  4. Krisztina Kis-Katos & Helge Liebert & Guenther G. Schulze, 2012. "On the Heterogeneity of Terror," Discussion Paper Series 19, Department of International Economic Policy, University of Freiburg, revised May 2012.
  5. Martin Gassebner & Simon Luechinger, 2011. "Lock, Stock, and Barrel: A Comprehensive Assessment of the Determinants of Terror," CESifo Working Paper Series 3550, CESifo Group Munich.
  6. Javier Gardeazabal, 2011. "Terrorism, Economic Downturns and Elections," EUSECON Policy Briefing 4, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
  7. Axel Dreher & Andreas Fuchs, 2011. "Does terror increase aid?," Courant Research Centre: Poverty, Equity and Growth - Discussion Papers 86, Courant Research Centre PEG.
  8. Axel Dreher & Justina Fischer, 2008. "Decentralization as a disincentive for transnational terror? System stability versus government efficiency: an empirical test," TWI Research Paper Series 41, Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universität Konstanz.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:52:y:2011:i:4:p:1253-1270. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or ().

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.