A Dynamic Oligopoly Structural Model For The Prescription Drug Market After Patent Expiration
AbstractThis article incorporates consumer learning and heterogeneity into a dynamic oligopoly model for the prescription drug market. In the model, both firms and patients need to learn the generic qualities via patients' experiences, generic firms' entry decisions are endogenous, but their entry timings depend on a random approval process. I apply the model to examine the impact of shortening the expected generic approval time. Although this policy experiment brings generics to the market sooner, it increases a potential entrant's likelihood of entering a crowded market and hence could reduce the total number of generic entrants and consumer welfare.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association in its journal International Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 51 (2010)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
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Other versions of this item:
- Andrew Ching, 2004. "A Dynamic Oligopoly Structural Model for the Prescription Drug Market After Patent Expiration," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 735, Econometric Society.
- C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L65 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Manufacturing - - - Chemicals; Rubber; Drugs; Biotechnology
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