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Inequality, Incomplete Contracts, And The Size Distribution Of Business Firms

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  • Thomas Gall

Abstract

This article analyzes the effects of intrafirm bargaining on the formation of firms in an economy with imperfect capital markets and contracting constraints. In equilibrium, wealth inequality induces a heterogeneous distribution of firm sizes, allowing for firms both too small and too large in terms of technical efficiency. The findings connect well to empirical facts such as the missing middle of firm-size distributions in developing countries. The model can encompass a nonmonotonic relationship between aggregate output and inequality. It turns out that an inflow of capital may indeed decrease output in absolute terms. Copyright (2010) by the Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.

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  • Thomas Gall, 2010. "Inequality, Incomplete Contracts, And The Size Distribution Of Business Firms," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 51(2), pages 335-364, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:51:y:2010:i:2:p:335-364
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    Cited by:

    1. Gutiérrez-Romero, Roxana, 2021. "How does inequality affect long-run growth? Cross-industry, cross-country evidence," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 274-297.
    2. Sanjay Jain, 2021. "Informal employment or informal firms? Regulatory enforcement and the transformation of the informal sector," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-2021-123, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    3. Roxana Gutiérrez-Romero, 2020. "Inequality affects long-run growth: Cross-industry, cross-country evidence," Working Papers 102, Queen Mary, University of London, School of Business and Management, Centre for Globalisation Research.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • O12 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution

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