Imperfect Monitoring And The Discounting Of Inside Money
AbstractThis article evaluates the efficiency of a requirement that private issuers redeem inside money on demand at par in a random-matching model of money where the issuers of inside money are imperfectly monitored. I find that for sufficiently imperfect monitoring, a par redemption requirement leads to lower social welfare than if private money were redeemed at a discount. A central message of the article is that if inside money and outside money are not perfect substitutes, a par redemption requirement may not be socially optimal because such a requirement effectively binds them to circulate as if they are. Copyright � 2008 the Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association in its journal International Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 49 (2008)
Issue (Month): 3 (08)
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- David C. Mills, Jr., 2007. "Imperfect monitoring and the discounting of inside money," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2007-58, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
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