Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Why Does It Matter That Beliefs And Valuations Be Correctly Represented?

Contents:

Author Info

  • Simon Grant
  • Edi Karni

Abstract

This article contains an analysis of a simple principal-agent problem illustrating possible problems that may arise when the prinicpal ascribes to the agent subjective probabilities and utilities that are implied by the subjective expected utility model but do not represent the agent's beliefs and valuations. In particular, it is possible that an incentive contract designed by the principal induces the agent to choose an action that is not in the principal's best interest. Copyright 2005 by the Economics Department Of The University Of Pennsylvania And Osaka University Institute Of Social And Economic Research Association.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/servlet/useragent?func=synergy&synergyAction=showTOC&journalCode=iere&volume=46&issue=3&year=2005&part=null
File Function: link to full text
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association in its journal International Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 46 (2005)
Issue (Month): 3 (08)
Pages: 917-934

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:46:y:2005:i:3:p:917-934

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 160 McNeil Building, 3718 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297
Phone: (215) 898-8487
Fax: (215) 573-2057
Email:
Web page: http://www.econ.upenn.edu/ier
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Email:
Web: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/subs.asp?ref=0020-6598

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Karni, Edi & Postlewaite, Andrew, 2005. "David Schmeidler," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 1-2, January.
  2. Edi Karni & Philippe Mongin, 2000. "On the Determination of Subjective Probability by Choices," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 46(2), pages 233-248, February.
  3. Jon Elster, 1998. "Emotions and Economic Theory," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 36(1), pages 47-74, March.
  4. Luce, R Duncan & Krantz, David H, 1971. "Conditional Expected Utility," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 39(2), pages 253-71, March.
  5. Karni, Edi, 2003. " On the Representation of Beliefs by Probabilities," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 26(1), pages 17-38, January.
  6. Karni, Edi, 2007. "Foundations of Bayesian theory," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 167-188, January.
  7. Romer, Paul M., 2000. "Thinking and Feeling," Research Papers 1618, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
  8. Paolo Ghirardato, 2002. "Revisiting Savage in a conditional world," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 20(1), pages 83-92.
  9. Berg Joyce & Dickhaut John & McCabe Kevin, 1995. "Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 122-142, July.
  10. Karni, Edi, 1996. "Probabilities and Beliefs," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 249-62, November.
  11. Karni, Edi & Schmeidler, David, 1993. "On the Uniqueness of Subjective Probabilities," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 267-77, April.
  12. Bengt Holmstrom, 1979. "Moral Hazard and Observability," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 74-91, Spring.
  13. George Loewenstein, 2000. "Emotions in Economic Theory and Economic Behavior," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(2), pages 426-432, May.
  14. Colin F. Camerer, 1997. "Progress in Behavioral Game Theory," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(4), pages 167-188, Fall.
  15. Steven Shavell, 1979. "Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 55-73, Spring.
  16. Grant, Simon & Karni, Edi, 2004. "A theory of quantifiable beliefs," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(5), pages 515-546, August.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Marie-Louise Vierø, 2006. "Contracting in Vague Environments," Working Papers 1106, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
  2. Sadowski, Philipp, 2013. "Contingent preference for flexibility: eliciting beliefs from behavior," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(2), May.
  3. David Dillenberger & Andrew Postlewaite & Kareen Rozen, 2011. "Optimism and Pessimism with Expected Utility," PIER Working Paper Archive 11-036, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 25 Oct 2011.
  4. Philipp Sadowski, 2011. "Contingent Preference for Flexibility: Eliciting Beliefs from Behavior," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000001189, David K. Levine.
  5. David Dillenberger & Andrew Postlewaite & Kareen Rozen, 2011. "Optimism and Pessimism with Expected Utility, Second Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 12-031, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 10 Aug 2012.
  6. David Dillenberger & Andrew Postlewaite & Kareen Rozen, 2011. "Optimism and Pessimism with Expected Utility, Fourth Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 13-068, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 01 Nov 2013.
  7. David Dillenberger & Andrew Postlewaite & Kareen Rozen, 2011. "Optimism and Pessimism with Expected Utility, Third Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 13-001, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 26 Dec 2012.
  8. Sadowski, Philipp, 2008. "Conditional Preference for Flexibility: Eliciting Beliefs from Behavior," MPRA Paper 8614, University Library of Munich, Germany.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:46:y:2005:i:3:p:917-934. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or ().

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.