Why Does It Matter That Beliefs And Valuations Be Correctly Represented?
AbstractThis article contains an analysis of a simple principal-agent problem illustrating possible problems that may arise when the prinicpal ascribes to the agent subjective probabilities and utilities that are implied by the subjective expected utility model but do not represent the agent's beliefs and valuations. In particular, it is possible that an incentive contract designed by the principal induces the agent to choose an action that is not in the principal's best interest. Copyright 2005 by the Economics Department Of The University Of Pennsylvania And Osaka University Institute Of Social And Economic Research Association.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association in its journal International Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 46 (2005)
Issue (Month): 3 (08)
Contact details of provider:
Postal: 160 McNeil Building, 3718 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297
Phone: (215) 898-8487
Fax: (215) 573-2057
Web page: http://www.econ.upenn.edu/ier
More information through EDIRC
Other versions of this item:
- Grant, Simon & Karni, Edi, 2003. "Why Does It Matter That Beliefs and Valuations Be Correctly Represented?," Working Papers 2003-02, Rice University, Department of Economics.
- Grant, S. & Karni, E., 2002. "Why Does it Matter that Beliefs and Valuations be Correctly Represented?," Discussion Paper 2002-12, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Luce, R Duncan & Krantz, David H, 1971. "Conditional Expected Utility," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 39(2), pages 253-71, March.
- Grant, Simon & Karni, Edi, 2004. "A theory of quantifiable beliefs," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(5), pages 515-546, August.
- Karni, Edi, 1996. "Probabilities and Beliefs," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 249-62, November.
- Karni, Edi & Postlewaite, Andrew, 2005. "David Schmeidler," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 1-2, January.
- Romer, Paul M., 2000.
"Thinking and Feeling,"
1618, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
- Karni, Edi & Schmeidler, David, 1993.
"On the Uniqueness of Subjective Probabilities,"
Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 267-77, April.
- George Loewenstein, 2000. "Emotions in Economic Theory and Economic Behavior," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(2), pages 426-432, May.
- Jon Elster, 1998. "Emotions and Economic Theory," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 36(1), pages 47-74, March.
- Edi Karni, 2005.
"Foundations of Bayesian Theory,"
Economics Working Paper Archive
524, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
- Berg Joyce & Dickhaut John & McCabe Kevin, 1995. "Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 122-142, July.
- E. Karni & Ph. Mongin, 1997.
"On the determination of subjective probability by choices,"
THEMA Working Papers
97-37, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
- Edi Karni & Philippe Mongin, 2000. "On the Determination of Subjective Probability by Choices," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 46(2), pages 233-248, February.
- Karni, E. & Mongin, P., 1997. "On the Determination of Subjective Probability by Choices," Papers 9737, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor..
- Karni, Edi, 2003. " On the Representation of Beliefs by Probabilities," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 26(1), pages 17-38, January.
- Paolo Ghirardato, 2002. "Revisiting Savage in a conditional world," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 20(1), pages 83-92.
- Bengt Holmstrom, 1979.
"Moral Hazard and Observability,"
Bell Journal of Economics,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 74-91, Spring.
- Colin F. Camerer, 1997. "Progress in Behavioral Game Theory," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(4), pages 167-188, Fall.
- Philipp Sadowski, 2011. "Contingent Preference for Flexibility: Eliciting Beliefs from Behavior," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000001189, David K. Levine.
- David Dillenberger & Andrew Postlewaite & Kareen Rozen, 2012.
"Optimism and Pessimism with Expected Utility,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
786969000000000353, David K. Levine.
- David Dillenberger & Andrew Postlewaite & Kareen Rozen, 2011. "Optimism and Pessimism with Expected Utility," PIER Working Paper Archive 11-036, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 25 Oct 2011.
- David Dillenberger & Andrew Postlewaite & Kareen Rozen, 2011. "Optimism and Pessimism with Expected Utility," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1829, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Marie-Louise Vierø, 2006.
"Contracting in Vague Environments,"
1106, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
- Sadowski, Philipp, 2008. "Conditional Preference for Flexibility: Eliciting Beliefs from Behavior," MPRA Paper 8614, University Library of Munich, Germany.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or ().
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.