Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

The Economics of Collective Negotiation in Pretrial Bargaining

Contents:

Author Info

  • Yeon-Koo Che

    (University of Wisconsin-Madison, U.S.A.)

Abstract

This article studies the strategic use of collective negotiation in multiplaintiff litigation. Compared with one-on-one negotiation, collective negotiation can change the distribution of per-plaintiff damages in a manner that influences the defendant's bargaining incentive. Informational asymmetry among the members of collective action and delegation of bargaining to a self-interested representative can yield a tougher bargaining position. A plaintiff's decision to join the collective action can signal his type, which in turn influences the defendant's bargaining behavior. In equilibrium, some plaintiffs join the action for fear of sending a bad signal. Copyright Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://openurl.ingenta.com/content?genre=article&issn=0020-6598&volume=43&spage=549
Download Restriction: Free access to full text is restricted to Ingenta subscribers.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association in its journal International Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 43 (2002)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
Pages: 549-576

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:43:y:2002:i:2:p:549-576

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 160 McNeil Building, 3718 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297
Phone: (215) 898-8487
Fax: (215) 573-2057
Email:
Web page: http://www.econ.upenn.edu/ier
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Email:
Web: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/subs.asp?ref=0020-6598

Related research

Keywords:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Yeon-Koo Che & Kathryn E. Spier, 2007. "Exploiting Plaintiffs Through Settlement: Divide and Conquer," Discussion Papers 0607-18, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
  2. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2007. "Mass Torts and the Incentives for Suit, Settlement, and Trial," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0713, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:43:y:2002:i:2:p:549-576

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or ().

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.