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Turnover Externalities with Marketplace Trading

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Author Info
Coles, Melvyn G

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Abstract

This article considers equilibrium decentralized trade when there is a marketplace where buyers and sellers meet costlessly. Since buyers have idiosyncratic match payoffs for each seller's good, some buyers, rather than trade with the current stock of sellers, wait for new sellers to enter the marketplace to obtain a good they like. A turnover externality exists where all traders are better off with higher entry rates of new traders. Furthermore, this turnover externality supports multiple Pareto-rankable equilibria. This provides new insights into similar results obtained in the random-matching literature. Copyright 1999 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association in its journal International Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 40 (1999)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
Pages: 851-68
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Handle: RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:40:y:1999:i:4:p:851-68

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  1. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2003. "On Second Price Auctions and Imperfect Competition," CEPR Discussion Papers 3774, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. B Petrongolo & C A Pissarides, 2000. "Looking Into the Black Box: A Survey of the Matching Function," CEP Discussion Papers 0470, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Margaret Stevens, 2002. "New Microfoundations for the Aggregate Matching Function, with Empirical and Theoretical Implications," Economics Series Working Papers 095, University of Oxford, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Coles, Melvyn & Petrongolo, Barbara, 2003. "A Test between Unemployment Theories Using Matching Data," IZA Discussion Papers 723, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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