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Turnover Externalities with Marketplace Trading

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  • Coles, Melvyn G

Abstract

This article considers equilibrium decentralized trade when there is a marketplace where buyers and sellers meet costlessly. Since buyers have idiosyncratic match payoffs for each seller's good, some buyers, rather than trade with the current stock of sellers, wait for new sellers to enter the marketplace to obtain a good they like. A turnover externality exists where all traders are better off with higher entry rates of new traders. Furthermore, this turnover externality supports multiple Pareto-rankable equilibria. This provides new insights into similar results obtained in the random-matching literature. Copyright 1999 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association in its journal International Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 40 (1999)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
Pages: 851-68

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Handle: RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:40:y:1999:i:4:p:851-68

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Cited by:
  1. Barbara Petrongolo & Christopher Pissarides, 2000. "Looking into the black box: a survey of the matching function," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 2122, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  2. Gregg, Paul & Petrongolo, Barbara, 2005. "Stock-flow matching and the performance of the labor market," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(8), pages 1987-2011, November.
  3. Coles, Melvyn & Petrongolo, Barbara, 2003. "A Test between Unemployment Theories Using Matching Data," IZA Discussion Papers 723, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  4. Chudik, Alexander, 2012. "A simple model of price dispersion," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(1), pages 344-347.
  5. Julien, BenoI^t & Kennes, John & King, Ian, 2008. "Bidding for money," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 142(1), pages 196-217, September.
  6. van Ommeren, Jos & Russo, Giovanni, 2009. "Firm Recruitment Behaviour: Sequential or Non-Sequential Search?," IZA Discussion Papers 4008, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  7. Ewa Gałecka-Burdziak, 2012. "Labour market matching – the case of Poland," Bank i Kredyt, National Bank of Poland, Economic Institute, vol. 43(3), pages 31-46.
  8. Wright, Randall & Trejos, Alberto, 2014. "Search-Based Models of Money and Finance: An Integrated Approach," Working Papers 709, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  9. Carlos Carrillo-Tudela & Eric Smith, 2009. "Wage dispersion and wage dynamics within and across firms," Working Paper 2009-22, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
  10. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2003. "On second-price auctions and imperfect competition," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(8), pages 901-909, November.
  11. repec:dgr:uvatin:2004109 is not listed on IDEAS
  12. Kuo, Mien-Yun & Smith, Eric, 2009. "Marketplace matching in Britain: Evidence from individual unemployment spells," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 37-46, January.
  13. Paulina Restrepo-Echavarria & Antonella Tutino & Anton Cheremukhin, 2012. "The Assignment of Workers to Jobs with Endogenous Information Selection," 2012 Meeting Papers 164, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  14. Melvyn Coles & Barbara Petrongolo, 2003. "A test between unemployment theories using matching data," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 3663, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  15. Jos van Ommeren & Giovanni Russo, 2004. "Sequential or Non-sequential Recruitment?," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 04-109/3, Tinbergen Institute, revised 15 Sep 2008.

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