The R&D Incentives of Industry Leaders
AbstractThis paper presents a model to explain why industry leader firms often devote substantial resources to R&D activities and explores the welfare implications of this investment. The key new assumption is that industry leaders can improve their own products more easily than can other firms. When industry leaders have R&D cost advantages, it is optimal for the government to subsidize the R&D expenditures of all firms, subsidize the production expenditures of industry leaders, and tax the profits of new industry leaders. Without government intervention, market forces generate too much creative destruction. Copyright 1999 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association in its journal International Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 40 (1999)
Issue (Month): 3 (August)
Contact details of provider:
Postal: 160 McNeil Building, 3718 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297
Phone: (215) 898-8487
Fax: (215) 573-2057
Web page: http://www.econ.upenn.edu/ier
More information through EDIRC
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Pedro Mazeda Gil & Óscar Afonso, 2008.
"Technological-Knowledge Dynamics in Lab-Equipment Models of Quality Ladders,"
FEP Working Papers
283, Universidade do Porto, Faculdade de Economia do Porto.
- Pedro Mazeda Gil & Oscar Afonso, 2011. "Technological-knowledge dynamics in lab-equipment models of quality ladders," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 18(4), pages 333-336.
- Segerstrom, Paul S., 1998.
"The Long-Run Growth Effects of R&D Subsidies,"
Working Paper Series
506, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
- Segerstrom, Paul S., 1999.
Working Paper Series
524, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
- Ledezma, Ivan, 2013. "Defensive Strategies in the Quality Ladders," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/4966, Paris Dauphine University.
- Nepelski, Daniel, 2010.
"Competition and Innovation: ICT- and non-ICT-enabled Product and Process Innovations,"
26239, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Nepelski, Daniel, 2010. "Competition and Innovation: ICT- and non-ICT-enabled Product and Process Innovations," MPRA Paper 26243, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Gautier Duflos, 2006. "Persistence of innovation, technological change and quality-adjusted patents in the US pharmaceutical industry," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques bla06029, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
- James M. Zolnierek, 1998. "Firm Level Behavior in Repeated R&D Races," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 24(3), pages 293-308, Summer.
- Petsas, Iordanis, 2009. "General Purpose Technologies and their Implications for International Trade," MPRA Paper 14446, University Library of Munich, Germany.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or ().
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.