This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Contracting with Qualified Suppliers

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Riordan, Michael H

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

In an extension of the Laffont-Tirole model, a buyer fully qualifies a set of suppliers ex ante and awards production to the most efficient ex post. The buyer's incomplete information about production costs biases ex ante market structure in favor of a greater number of qualified suppliers. Further extensions that allow product differentiation and learning-by-doing suggest explanations for split production awards and less than fully qualified suppliers. Copyright 1996 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.

Download Info
To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Publisher Info
Article provided by Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association in its journal International Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 37 (1996)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
Pages: 115-28
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:37:y:1996:i:1:p:115-28

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 160 McNeil Building, 3718 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297
Phone: (215) 898-8487
Fax: (215) 573-2057
Email:
Web page: http://www.econ.upenn.edu/ier
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Email:
Web: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/subs.asp?ref=0020-6598

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: ().

Related research
Keywords:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Eckhard Janeba, 2000. "Tax Competition When Governments Lack Commitment: Excess Capacity as a Countervailing Threat," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(5), pages 1508-1519, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Rachel E. Kranton & Deborah F. Minehart, 2001. "A Theory of Buyer-Seller Networks," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 485-508, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Yongmin Chen & Ruqu Wang, 2005. "Market Design with Correlated Valuations," Working Papers 1034, Queen's University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Kerschbamer, Rudolf & Tournas, Yanni, 2000. "In-House Competition, Organizational Slack and the Business Cycle," CEPR Discussion Papers 2557, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? You too can volunteer for RePEc, for example by editing a NEP report.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-21.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.