Endogenous Learning, Learning by Doing and Information Sharing
AbstractUsing the work in experimentation, the author endogenizes the, until now, exogenous information in information sharing models. He finds that agreements to exchange information affect the value and production of information. With unknown cost, a learning-by-doing like effect also arises. These effects affect consumer welfare, the incentive to receive information, and the incentive to enter information sharing agreements. Information sharing contracts may have negative future effects on firms through decreased information production. However, the decreased information production has the current benefit of softening competition, which induces information sharing agreements under conditions contrary to previous results and vice versa. Copyright 1995 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association in its journal International Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 36 (1995)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
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Other versions of this item:
- Creane, A., 1992. "Endogenous Learning, Learning by Doing and Information Sharing," Papers 9106, Michigan State - Econometrics and Economic Theory.
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- Dimitrova, Magdalena & Schlee, Edward E., 2003. "Monopoly, competition and information acquisition," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(10), pages 1623-1642, December.
- François Moreau & Jean Lainé & Gilbert Laffond & Jacques Lesourne & Nicolas Curien & Emmanuelle Fauchart, 2001.
"Forums de consommation sur Internet. Un modèle évolutionniste,"
Programme National Persée, vol. 52(1), pages 119-135.
- Nicolas Curien & Emmanuelle Fauchart & Gilbert Laffond & Jean Lainé & Jacques Lesourne & François Moreau, 2001. "Forums de consommation sur Internet. Un modèle évolutionniste," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 52(7), pages 119-135.
- Bipasa Datta, . "Experimentation, Information sharing and Oligopoly Limit Pricing," Discussion Papers 99/34, Department of Economics, University of York.
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