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Endogenous Learning, Learning by Doing and Information Sharing

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  • Creane, Anthony

Abstract

Using the work in experimentation, the author endogenizes the, until now, exogenous information in information sharing models. He finds that agreements to exchange information affect the value and production of information. With unknown cost, a learning-by-doing like effect also arises. These effects affect consumer welfare, the incentive to receive information, and the incentive to enter information sharing agreements. Information sharing contracts may have negative future effects on firms through decreased information production. However, the decreased information production has the current benefit of softening competition, which induces information sharing agreements under conditions contrary to previous results and vice versa. Copyright 1995 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.

Suggested Citation

  • Creane, Anthony, 1995. "Endogenous Learning, Learning by Doing and Information Sharing," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 36(4), pages 985-1002, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:36:y:1995:i:4:p:985-1002
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    Cited by:

    1. Bipasa Datta, "undated". "Experimentation, Information sharing and Oligopoly Limit Pricing," Discussion Papers 99/34, Department of Economics, University of York.
    2. Dimitrova, Magdalena & Schlee, Edward E., 2003. "Monopoly, competition and information acquisition," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(10), pages 1623-1642, December.
    3. Nicolas Curien & Emmanuelle Fauchart & Gilbert Laffond & Jean Lainé & Jacques Lesourne & François Moreau, 2001. "Forums de consommation sur Internet. Un modèle évolutionniste," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 52(1), pages 119-135.
    4. Herrera, Helios & Reuben, Ernesto & Ting, Michael M., 2017. "Turf wars," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 143-153.
    5. Creane, Anthony, 1995. "The value to a firm of its rival learning," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 171-174, August.
    6. Myatt, David P. & Wallace, Chris, 2015. "Cournot competition and the social value of information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 158(PB), pages 466-506.

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