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Political Economy of Monetary and Budgetary Policy

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  • van der Ploeg, Frederick

Abstract

Even though all debt and wage contracts are indexed, there is an incentive to levy a surprise inflation tax as this erodes the real value of debt service, permits a cut in the tax rate, and boosts private consumption. With rules it is optimal to smooth tax and seigniorage revenues. However, with discretion (associated with the Markov-perfect equilibrium) the government finances an increase in spending through additional interest income paid on assets that are generated through a temporary bout of inflation and taxation. The electorate prefers to appoint a central banker more concerned with inflation than the median voter. Copyright 1995 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.

Suggested Citation

  • van der Ploeg, Frederick, 1995. "Political Economy of Monetary and Budgetary Policy," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 36(2), pages 427-439, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:36:y:1995:i:2:p:427-39
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    Cited by:

    1. Beetsma, Roel M. W. J. & Jensen, Henrik, 2003. "Structural convergence under reversible and irreversible monetary unification," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 417-439, June.
    2. Westerhout, Ed & Beetsma, Roel, 2019. "A comparison of nominal and indexed debt under fiscal constraints," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 177-194.
    3. van der Ploeg, Frederick, 1995. "Solvency of counter-cyclical policy rules," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 45-65, May.
    4. Mazhar, Ummad & Méon, Pierre-Guillaume, 2017. "Taxing the unobservable: The impact of the shadow economy on inflation and taxation," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 89-103.
    5. Patrizio Tirelli, 1997. "Dynamic Seigniorage Models Revisited. Should Fiscal Flexibility and Conservative Central Bankers Go Together?," Working Papers 19, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Feb 1999.
    6. Aziz N. Berdiev & James W. Saunoris, 2023. "The case for independence: Does central bank independence curb the spread of the underground economy?," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 76(3), pages 407-435, August.
    7. Kadria, Mohamed & Ben Aissa, Mohamed Safouane, 2016. "Inflation targeting and public deficit in emerging countries: A time varying treatment effect approach," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 52(PA), pages 108-114.
    8. Marco Lossani & Piergiovanna Natale & Patrizio Tirelli, 2001. "Fiscal Policy and Inflation Targets: Does Credibility Matter?," Economia politica, Società editrice il Mulino, issue 3, pages 371-392.
    9. M. Lossani & P. Natale, & P. Tirelli, 1997. "Fiscal Policy and Imperfectly Credible Inflation Targets: Should We Appoint Expenditure-Conservative Central Bankers?," Working Papers 9707, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.
    10. Beetsma, Roel M.W.J. & Lans Bovenberg, A., 2006. "Political shocks and public debt: The case for a conservative central bank revisited," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 30(11), pages 1857-1883, November.

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