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Abstract

The author studies models of sovereign debt bargaining of the kind proposed by J. Bulow and K. Rogoff. All agents act rationally with perfect foresight and perfect information. The main departure from previous studies is that the government of the debtor country acts on behalf of, but is not identical to, its representative citizen. This seemingly minor change surprisingly implies that there is an indeterminacy of bargaining outcomes, including some of the sunspots type; agreement may be delayed for many periods; and marginal debt may not be worthless. Copyright 1995 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association in its journal International Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 36 (1995)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
Pages: 387-405

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Handle: RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:36:y:1995:i:2:p:387-405

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Cited by:

1. Eaton, Jonathan & Fernandez, Raquel, 1995. "Sovereign debt," Handbook of International Economics, in: G. M. Grossman & K. Rogoff (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 3, pages 2031-2077 Elsevier.
   
   • Eaton, J. & Fernandez, R., 1995. "Sovereign Debt," Papers 37, Boston University - Department of Economics.
   • Jonathan Eaton & Raquel Fernandez, 1995. "Sovereign Debt," Boston University - Institute for Economic Development 59, Boston University, Institute for Economic Development.
   • Jonathan Eaton & Raquel Fernandez, 1995. "Sovereign Debt," NBER Working Papers 5131, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
2. Mark L . J. Wright, 2004. "Private capital flows, capital controls, and default risk," Pacific Basin Working Paper Series 2004-34, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
   
   • Wright, Mark L.J., 2006. "Private capital flows, capital controls, and default risk," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 120-149, June.
   • Mark L. J. Wright, 2004. "Private capital flows, capital controls, and default risk," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, issue Jun.
3. Klimenko, Mikhail M., 2002. "Trade interdependence, the international financial institutions, and the recent evolution of sovereign-debt renegotiations," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 177-209, October.
4. Roberto Chang, 1995. "Political party negotiations, income distribution, and endogenous growth," Working Paper 95-3, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
   
   • Chang, Roberto, 1998. "Political party negotiations, income distribution, and endogenous growth," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 227-255, April.
   • Chang, R., 1992. "Political Party Negotiations, Income Distribution and Endogenous Growth," Working Papers 92-39, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.

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