Private Investment and Sovereign Debt Negotiations
AbstractThe author studies models of sovereign debt bargaining of the kind proposed by J. Bulow and K. Rogoff. All agents act rationally with perfect foresight and perfect information. The main departure from previous studies is that the government of the debtor country acts on behalf of, but is not identical to, its representative citizen. This seemingly minor change surprisingly implies that there is an indeterminacy of bargaining outcomes, including some of the sunspots type; agreement may be delayed for many periods; and marginal debt may not be worthless. Copyright 1995 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association in its journal International Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 36 (1995)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
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Other versions of this item:
- Roberto Chang, 1993. "Private investment and sovereign debt negotiations," Working Paper 93-8, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
- Chang, Roberto, 1991. "Private Investment and Sovereign Debt Negotiations," Working Papers 91-47, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
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- Mark L . J. Wright, 2004. "Private capital flows, capital controls, and default risk," Working Paper Series 2004-34, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
- Wright, Mark L.J., 2006.
"Private capital flows, capital controls, and default risk,"
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- Jonathan Eaton & Raquel Fernandez, 1995.
NBER Working Papers
5131, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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- Chang, Roberto, 1998.
"Political party negotiations, income distribution, and endogenous growth,"
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- Chang, R., 1992. "Political Party Negotiations, Income Distribution and Endogenous Growth," Working Papers 92-39, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
- Roberto Chang, 1995. "Political party negotiations, income distribution, and endogenous growth," Working Paper 95-3, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
- Klimenko, Mikhail M., 2002. "Trade interdependence, the international financial institutions, and the recent evolution of sovereign-debt renegotiations," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 177-209, October.
- repec:fip:fedfpb:2004-34 is not listed on IDEAS
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