Sunk Investment, Bargaining and Choice of Capital Structure
AbstractThis paper shows how a firm might optimally choose debt to affect the outcome of bilateral bargaining with workers or other input suppliers. It is shown that debt may alleviate the well-known underinvestment problem associated. with the inability to write precommitment contracts. Also, in such circumstances, debt could be Pareto improving over complete equity financing. The relationship between the optimal level of debt and asset specificity of investmen t and bargaining power of the firm vis-a-vis the workers is explored. The Williamson conjecture that higher asset specificity will lead to less debt is shown not to be valid in general. Copyright 1993 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association in its journal International Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 34 (1993)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
Contact details of provider:
Postal: 160 McNeil Building, 3718 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297
Phone: (215) 898-8487
Fax: (215) 573-2057
Web page: http://www.econ.upenn.edu/ier
More information through EDIRC
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Card, David & Devicienti, Francesco & Maida, Agata, 2011.
"Rent-Sharing, Hold-up, and Wages: Evidence from Matched Panel Data,"
IZA Discussion Papers
6086, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- David Card & Francesco Devicienti & Agata Maida, 2010. "Rent-sharing, Holdup, and Wages: Evidence from Matched Panel Data," NBER Working Papers 16192, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Bae, Kee-Hong & Kang, Jun-Koo & Wang, Jin, 2011. "Employee treatment and firm leverage: A test of the stakeholder theory of capital structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 100(1), pages 130-153, April.
- Hennessy, Christopher A. & Livdan, Dmitry, 2009. "Debt, bargaining, and credibility in firm-supplier relationships," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(3), pages 382-399, September.
- Dailami, Mansoor & Leipziger, Danny, 1997.
"Infrastructure project finance and capital flows : a new perspective,"
Policy Research Working Paper Series
1861, The World Bank.
- Dailami, Mansoor & Leipziger, Danny, 1998. "Infrastructure Project Finance and Capital Flows: A New Perspective," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 26(7), pages 1283-1298, July.
- Erkki Koskela & Rune Stenbacka, 2001. "Equilibrium Unemployment with Credit and Labour Market Imperfections," CESifo Working Paper Series 419, CESifo Group Munich.
- Kale, Jayant R. & Shahrur, Husayn, 2007. "Corporate capital structure and the characteristics of suppliers and customers," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 321-365, February.
- Franck, Tom & Huyghebaert, Nancy, 2006. "Non-financial stakeholder relationship costs as determinant of capital structure: Empirical evidence from first-time business start-ups," Open Access publications from Katholieke Universiteit Leuven urn:hdl:123456789/385790, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven.
- Sentis, Patrick, 2001. "Sous-investissement et suppression d’effectifs : vers une réduction des coûts d’agence," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 77(1), pages 5-26, mars.
- Franck, Tom & Huyghebaert, Nancy, 2006. "Non-financial stakeholder relationship costs as determinant of capital structure: Empirical evidence from first-time business start-ups," Open Access publications from Katholieke Universiteit Leuven urn:hdl:123456789/230209, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven.
- Efraim Benmelech & Nittai K. Bergman & Ricardo Enriquez, 2011. "Negotiating with Labor Under Financial Distress," NBER Working Papers 17192, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Koskela, Erkki & Stenbacka, Rune, 2003. "Profit Sharing and Unemployment: An Approach with Bargaining and Efficiency Wage Economics," Discussion Papers 863, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy.
- Addessi, William & Busato, Francesco, 2009. "Fair wages, labor relations and asset returns," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 5(4), pages 410-430, December.
- Ryen, Glen T. & Vasconcellos, Geraldo M. & Kish, Richard J., 1997. "Capital structure decisions: What have we learned?," Business Horizons, Elsevier, vol. 40(5), pages 41-50.
- Chu, Yongqiang, 2012. "Optimal capital structure, bargaining, and the supplier market structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 106(2), pages 411-426.
- Jorion, Philippe & Zhang, Gaiyan, 2007. "Good and bad credit contagion: Evidence from credit default swaps," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(3), pages 860-883, June.
- Koskela, Erkki & Stenbacka, Rune, 2004. "Profit Sharing, Credit Market Imperfections and Equilibrium Unemployment," IZA Discussion Papers 1020, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Jou, Jyh-Bang, 2001. "Entry, financing, and bankruptcy decisions: The limited liability effect," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 69-88.
- Camera, Gabriele & Selcuk, Cemil, 2006. "Bilateral Matching and Latin Squares," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1190, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
- Erkki Koskela & Rune Stenbacka, 2002. "Equilibrium Unemployment and Credit Market Imperfections: The Critical Role of Labour Mobility," CESifo Working Paper Series 654, CESifo Group Munich.
- Le Pape, Nicolas, 2001. "Endettement des firmes et comportements de rivalité : l’apport des principaux modèles en économie industrielle," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 77(2), pages 281-302, juin.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or ().
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.