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Why Is Investment Subsidized?

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Author Info
Hansson, Ingemar
Stuart, Charles
Abstract

In most economies, investment is subsidized while capital is taxed. This is difficult to explain in a traditional perfect-foresight, representative-agent setting in which a single government sets all current and future taxes on capital. The authors consider a sequential-game setting in which tax policy in a period is determined by the government in power in that period. In equilibrium, investment is subsidized while capital is taxed. Copyright 1989 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.

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Article provided by Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association in its journal International Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 30 (1989)
Issue (Month): 3 (August)
Pages: 549-59
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Handle: RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:30:y:1989:i:3:p:549-59

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  1. Alan J. Auerbach, 1990. "Public Sector Dynamics," NBER Working Papers 3508, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. G. Barba Navaretti & E. Santarelli & M. Vivarelli, 2000. "The Role of Subsidies in Promoting Italian Joint Ventures in Least Developed and Transition Economics," Working Papers 386, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna. [Downloadable!]
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