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A Theory of 'Oil'igopoly: Cournot Equilibrium in Exhaustible Resource Markets with Fixed Supplies

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  • Loury, Glenn C

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Article provided by Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association in its journal International Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 27 (1986)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Pages: 285-301

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Handle: RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:27:y:1986:i:2:p:285-301

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Cited by:
  1. Hassan Benchekroun & Cees Withagen, 2010. "On Price Taking Behavior In A Nonrenewable Resource Cartel-Fringe Game," Departmental Working Papers 2010-02, McGill University, Department of Economics.
  2. repec:dgr:uvatin:2011014 is not listed on IDEAS
  3. Keutiben, Octave, 2014. "On capturing foreign oil rents," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 542-555.
  4. L. Lambertini, 2013. "Exploration for Nonrenewable Resources in a Dynamic Oligopoly: An Arrovian Result," Working Papers wp859, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
  5. van Veldhuizen, Roel & Sonnemans, Joep, 2014. "Nonrenewable resources, strategic behavior and the hotelling rule: An experiment," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2014-203, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
  6. Colombo, Luca & Labrecciosa, Paola, 2013. "On the convergence to the Cournot equilibrium in a productive asset oligopoly," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(6), pages 441-445.
  7. Kristine Grimsrud & Knut Einar Rosendahl & Halvor Briseid Storrøsten & Marina Tsygankova, 2014. "Short Run Effects of Bleaker Prospects for Oligopolistic Producers of a Non-Renewable Resource," CESifo Working Paper Series 4579, CESifo Group Munich.
  8. BENCHEKROUN, Hassan & WITHAGEN, Cees, 2008. "Nonrenewable Resource Oligopolies and the Cartel-Fringe Game," Cahiers de recherche 14-2008, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
  9. Gerlagh, Reyer & Liski, Matti, 2011. "Strategic resource dependence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(2), pages 699-727, March.
  10. Salant, Stephen W., 1982. "Imperfect competition in the international energy market: a computerized Nash-Cournot model," MPRA Paper 12021, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  11. van den Berg, Anita & Bos, Iwan & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Peters, Hans, 2012. "Dynamic Cournot duopoly with intertemporal capacity constraints," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 174-192.

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