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Noncooperative and Dominant Player Solutions in Discrete Dynamic Games

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  • Kydland, Finn

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association in its journal International Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 16 (1975)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Pages: 321-35

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Handle: RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:16:y:1975:i:2:p:321-35

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Cited by:
  1. Caruana, Guillermo & Einav, Liran, 2005. "Production Targets," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt0n71m1ch, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
  2. William Roberds, 1986. "Solution of linear-quadratic- Gaussian dynamic games using variational methods," Staff Report 105, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  3. Judd, Kenneth L., 1997. "Computational economics and economic theory: Substitutes or complements?," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 21(6), pages 907-942, June.
  4. J. Subrick & Andrew Young, 2010. "Nobelity and novelty: Finn Kydland and Edward Prescott’s contributions viewed from Vienna," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer, vol. 23(1), pages 35-53, March.
  5. Ron Jarmin, 1993. "Asymmetric Learning Spillovers," Working Papers 93-7, Center for Economic Studies, U.S. Census Bureau.
  6. Vives, Xavier, 2006. "Strategic complementarity in multi-stage games," IESE Research Papers D/619, IESE Business School.
  7. Thille, H., 2002. "Inventions & Price Volatility in a Cournot Duopoly," Working Papers 2002-4, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.
  8. Lau, Sau-Him Paul, 2001. "Aggregate Pattern of Time-dependent Adjustment Rules, II: Strategic Complementarity and Endogenous Nonsynchronization," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 98(2), pages 199-231, June.
  9. Runge, C. Ford & von Witzke, Harald & Thompson, Shelley, 1987. "Liberal Agricultural Trade As A Public Good: Free Trade Versus Free Riding Under Gatt," Staff Papers 13635, University of Minnesota, Department of Applied Economics.
  10. Cheong, Kwang Soo & Choo, Kineung & Lee, Keun, 2010. "Understanding the behavior of business groups: A dynamic model and empirical analysis," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 141-152, November.
  11. Ambler, Steve & Paquet, Alain, 1997. "Recursive methods for computing equilibria of general equilibrium dynamic Stackelberg games," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 155-173, April.
  12. R. Cellini & L. Lambertini, 2003. "On the Dynamic Consistency of Optimal Monetary Policy," Working Papers 463, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
  13. Vives, Xavier, 2006. "Strategic Complementarities in Multi-Stage Games," CEPR Discussion Papers 5583, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  14. Chen, Baoline & Zadrozny, Peter A., 2002. "An anticipative feedback solution for the infinite-horizon, linear-quadratic, dynamic, Stackelberg game," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 26(9-10), pages 1397-1416, August.
  15. Thille, Henry, 2003. "Forward trading and storage in a Cournot duopoly," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 27(4), pages 651-665, February.
  16. Thomas Vallée, 1997. "Comparison of different Stackelberg solutions in a deterministic dynamic pollution control," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1406, David K. Levine.
  17. Kwang Soo Cheong & Kenneth L Judd, 1997. "Mergers and Dynamic Oligopoly," Working Papers 199714, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics.
  18. Gilles Oudiz & Jeffrey Sachs, 1984. "International Policy Coordination in Dynamic Macroeconomic Models," NBER Working Papers 1417, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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