Reglas de selección para la fiscalización de Impuestos a las Ventas
AbstractIn this paper we discuss the relevance of the major results found on the literature about optimal auditing rules to the case of a commodity tax. We found out that literature’s usual recommendations are not applied by tax administrations. In our understanding, this happens because of: i) there is a key difference between the assumed objective (theoretical) of the tax administration and the actual objectives, ii) every model assumes that taxpayers know audit rules, when in fact they are kept confidential by the tax administration. iii) most models restrict tax evasion to underreporting, iv) there might be practical or non-economical issues that prevent tax administrations using optimal auditing rules. We conclude that optimal audit rules bring in a very important issue usually neglected when tax administrations design an auditing policy: the impact of the audit policy on the returns of non-audited taxpayers.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Universidad Nacional de Córdoba, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas, Instituto de Economía y Finanzas in its journal Revista de Economía y Estadística.
Volume (Year): XLII (2004)
Issue (Month): 2 (July)
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Commodity Tax; Auditing Rules; Auditing Policy;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy
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