La configuración de una tasa judicial: análisis teórico
AbstractThis paper analyses the optimal design of a user charge on filing suit, which aims at maximising social welfare. Thus, this instrument must be useful to internalise the social costs and benefits by the litigants, in such a way that if social costs are lower than social benefits the user charge will become a subsidy. Moreover, the user charge can increase private welfare for those with a high probability of prevailing. Finally, from the results obtained in the theoretical analysis, we perform an exercise of comparative static by means of a numerical simulation.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Fundación SEPI in its journal Investigaciones Economicas.
Volume (Year): 26 (2002)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Investigaciones Economicas Fundación SEPI Quintana, 2 (planta 3) 28008 Madrid Spain
Web page: http://www.fundacionsepi.es/
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
- H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
- K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
You can help add them by filling out this form.
reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Access and download statisticsgeneral information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Isabel Sánchez-Seco).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.