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Algunos factores explicativos de la existencia de huelgas durante la negociación colectiva en España

Author

Listed:
  • Sergi Jimenez-Martin

    (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid)

  • José M. Labeaga

    (UNED and Universitat Pompeu Fabra)

  • Mariluz Marco

    (Universidad de Valencia)

Abstract

El propósito fundamental de este trabajo consiste en arrojar algo de luz a la determinación de las huelga de convenio en España. Con dicho fin planteamos una especificación que sea lo suficientemente flexible como para acomodar componentes que surgen tanto de la teoría de los costes conjuntos como de los modelos de información asimétrica. Los resultados fundamentales dan soportes a aspectos de ambas teorías, pero fundamentalmente a los modelos de signalling. En particular, la detección de dinámica en las especificacines estimadas invalida la hipótesis de existencia de aprendizaje y/o efecto reputación en los agentes que intervienen en la negociación que, de alguna manera, son supuestos básicos que sostiene la teoría de los costes conjuntos. Algunos shocks macroeconómicos también contribuyen decisivamente a la explicación de la probabilidad de observar huelgas en los procesos de negociación.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Sergi Jimenez-Martin & José M. Labeaga & Mariluz Marco, 1996. "Algunos factores explicativos de la existencia de huelgas durante la negociación colectiva en España," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 20(2), pages 217-242, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:iec:inveco:v:20:y:1996:i:2:p:217-242
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Miguel Malo & Nuria Sánchez-Sánchez, 2014. "The legal form of labour conflicts and their time persistence: an empirical analysis with a large firms’ panel," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 38(3), pages 513-533, December.
    2. Silviano Esteve Pérez & Mariluz Marco Aledo & María Engracia Rochina Barrachina, 2006. "A Competing Risks Analysis of Strike Duration in Spain: Agreement and Non-Agreement Outcomes," Revista de Economía Laboral - Spanish Journal of Labour Economics, Asociación Española de Economía Laboral - AEET, vol. 3, pages 14-45.
    3. García, Jaume & Jiménez-Martín, Sergi, 1998. "Claim, offer and information in wage bargaining," UC3M Working papers. Economics 4138, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.

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