Anticorruption campaigns and the determinants of corruption in Europe
AbstractSeveral studies shows that corruption is a persistent phenomenon and that many anticorruption campaigns failed in the past. After a review of the literature of the determinants of the dynamic of corruption, our paper investigates the phenomenon of persisting corruption in Italy and in other countries. Econometric estimates, using statistics on crimes against the public administration at a provincial level, show that corruption campaign 'Clean Hands' started in Italy in 1990 has been effective to fight corruption. The main conclusion of our work is that anticorruption campaigns have permanent effects if they intervene at the same time on economic, political and cultural factors.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Inderscience Enterprises Ltd in its journal World Review of Entrepreneurship, Management and Sustainable Development.
Volume (Year): 3 (2007)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
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Web page: http://www.inderscience.com/browse/index.php?journalID=173
corruption; anticorruption campaigns; political systems; social capital; Italy; Europe.;
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- Alfano, Maria Rosaria & Baraldi, Anna Laura & Cantabene, Claudia, 2013. "The role of political competition in the link between electoral systems and corruption: The Italian case," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 1-10.
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