IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ids/ijpman/v13y2020i2p199-213.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Efficiency and bid rigging in simultaneous procurement auctions under oligopoly

Author

Listed:
  • Aaro Hazak
  • Tanel Kerikmäe
  • Evelin Pärn-Lee

Abstract

Splitting of large procurements into several smaller ones has been propagated, for example in the European Union and OECD members, as a way for enhancing competition and improving institutional framework for market efficiency. This paper presents a conceptual argumentation on the causes and consequences of potential bid rigging when simultaneous bids for similar goods are asked from oligopolists. It appears that calling for similar bids simultaneously may incentivise collusion among bidders, while arranging several consecutive procurement auctions could lessen that problem. Moreover, simultaneous procurement auctions may result in a relatively high cost of supply due to the larger risks involved for bidders. Furthermore, bid rigging remains difficult to detect under simultaneous procurement auctions due to a large degree of uncertainty for bidders, which supports relatively high bid prices that may, in fact, be collusive.

Suggested Citation

  • Aaro Hazak & Tanel Kerikmäe & Evelin Pärn-Lee, 2020. "Efficiency and bid rigging in simultaneous procurement auctions under oligopoly," International Journal of Procurement Management, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 13(2), pages 199-213.
    • Handle: RePEc:ids:ijpman:v:13:y:2020:i:2:p:199-213
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.inderscience.com/link.php?id=106512
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Mihail Busu & Cristian Busu, 2021. "Detecting Bid-Rigging in Public Procurement. A Cluster Analysis Approach," Administrative Sciences, MDPI, vol. 11(1), pages 1-14, February.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ids:ijpman:v:13:y:2020:i:2:p:199-213. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sarah Parker (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.inderscience.com/browse/index.php?journalID=255 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.