Effect of Managerial Ownership Concentrated on Firm Return and Value: Evidence from Iran Stock Market
AbstractThe article aims to emphasize the importance of the Activity-Based Budgeting (ABB) implementation within This research examines the relationship between corporate governance and firm return and value which are two measures of firm performance. Absolutely, there are several measures for investigation the corporate governance but we picked up the ownership concentration as measure of it. In general, this paper tries to investigate ownership concentration and its effect on firm return and value in Iran Stock Market. An analysis has been made as evidence taking sample of listed non- financing firms from the Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE). Our sample consists of non-financial firms listed on Tehran stock exchange between 2007 and2009. Our findings indicate that ownership concentration has a negative and significant relationship with firm's value.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Human Resource Management Academic Research Society, International Journal of Academic Research in Accounting, Finance and Management Sciences in its journal International Journal of Academic Research in Accounting, Finance and Management Sciences.
Volume (Year): 3 (2013)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
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Web page: http://hrmars.com/index.php/pages/detail/Accounting-Finance-Journal
Corporate governance; ownership concentration; firm return; firm value; TSE;
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