Siegfried Berninghaus () (Department of Economics, University of Karlsruhe, Karlsruhe, Germany) Werner Güth () (Max Planck Institute for Research into Economic Systems, Jena, Germany) Hartmut Kliemt () (Department of Philosophy, University of Duisburg-Essen, Duisburg, Germany)
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Problems of social coordination can be formalized as non-cooperative games with several equilibria. We know that in such situations serious problems of equilibrium selection arise which cannot be solved by traditional game theoretical reasoning. Conventions seem to be a powerful tool to solve equilibrium selection problems in real world societies. Essentially, two questions will be addressed in this paper: (a) Which conventions will emerge in a society? (b) How can a society break away from an inferior and reach a superior convention? It turns out that “risk dominance” of a convention plays a crucial role in dealing with both questions and generally in the evolution of conventions.
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Article provided by Institute of SocioEconomics in its journal Homo Oeconomicus.
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