Dimitar Antov () (Economics Department, Northwestern University, Evanston, USA,) Edward Packel () (Mathematics Department, Lake Forest College, Lake Forest, USA)
Abstract
An explicit “empty core” condition is presented for superadditive games. This condition is then used to support an imputation for such games that we call the coordinated solution, that results from restricting bargaining to coalitions of size and . An assumption that a size coalition must form leads to an alternative version of the coordinated solution. In addition to several specific examples, some general theorems about how the coordinated solution relates to established solution concepts are presented.
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Institute of SocioEconomics in its journal Homo Oeconomicus.
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