IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/hom/homoec/v12y1995p155-183.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Ist die Normalform die normale Form?

Author

Listed:
  • Werner G³th

    (Humboldt-Universitõt zu Berlin, Institut f³r Wirtschaftstheorie, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultõt, Berlin, Deutschland)

  • Hartmut Kliemt

    (Humboldt Universitõt Duisburg, Philosophie und Sozialwissenschaften, Duisburg, Deutschland)

Abstract

Die Frage, welche Dartsellungsweise strategischer Interaktionen man als grundlegend f³r die spieltheoretische Analyse und insoweit als normale Form von Spielen anzusehen hat, ist keineswegs rein sprachlicher Natur. Systematische Gr³nde sprechen daf³r, die Agentennormalform anstelle der klassischen von Neumann Morgenstern Normalform f³r die "normale" Form eines Spieles zu halten. Dies wird unter Bezug auf verschiedene Beispiele und in kritischer Auseinandersetzung mit abweichenden allgemeinen theoretischen Auffassungen begr³ndet.

Suggested Citation

  • Werner G³th & Hartmut Kliemt, 1995. "Ist die Normalform die normale Form?," Homo Oeconomicus, Institute of SocioEconomics, vol. 12, pages 155-183.
    • Handle: RePEc:hom:homoec:v:12:y:1995:p:155-183
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Siegfried Berninghaus & Werner G³th & Hartmut Kliemt, 2003. "Reflections on Equilibrium: Ideal Rationality and Analytic Decomposition of Games," Homo Oeconomicus, Institute of SocioEconomics, vol. 20, pages 257-302.
    2. Werner Güth & Hartmut Kliemt & Stefan Napel, "undated". "Wie Du mir, so ich Dir! - Ökonomische Theorie und Experiment am Beispiel der Reziprozität," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2002-19, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hom:homoec:v:12:y:1995:p:155-183. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/sohamde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.