Resource revenues and political development in sub-Saharan Africa. Congo Republic in comparative perspective

This paper argues that the substantial oil wealth of Congo Republic has, paradoxically, been an impediment rather than a boon to the country's political development. This is intriguing since petroleum income has increased Congo's standard of living, and since the theoretical literature asociates higher standards of living with improved prospects for political development. The unexpected hazard of possessing such a valuable natural resource became particularly evident after Congo began experimenting with a multiparty political system in 1991. Before the democratic experiment began, petroleum revenues had served to create a society ill-suited for the development of democratic institutions. These revenuesmade the Congolese psychologically dependent on the state, caused excessive urbanization, and created unrealistic expectations in the population. During the years in which Congo tried to consolidate the multiparty system (1992-97), the petroleum-based economy did little to facilitate the process and much to undermine it. The case of Congo contrasts particularly with that of Benin, a country that shares with Congo a history of colonialism by France, a large intelligentsia, an post-colonial experiences with military, Marxist regimes, but not the petroleum endowment; Benin, however, has gone some way in consolidating its new democratic institutions. Accordingly, the Congo case suggests countries with substantial natural resource endowments will face special problems of democratic consolidation, even when they enjoy higher levels of development. This finding is important to the theoretical literature, which has mainly examined the link between oil wealth and democratic transition, but not that between oil wealth and democratic consolidation.