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CEO Turnover in the Italian Financial Market

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Author Info
Emilio Barucci () (Department of Mathematics, Politecnico di Milano)
Carlo Bianchi (University of Pisa)
Mirko Frediani (University of Pisa)
Abstract

We investigate ceo turnover in the Italian financial market analyzing a dataset covering the period 1992-2003 for all listed companies. The likelihood of ceo turnover is higher for poorly performing companies, unless the company is controlled by a family. Managers’ entrenchment is observed: managers holding shares of the company are less likely to lose their job. Ownership composition plays a relevant role: turnover is more likely when the largest shareholder holds a large stake or a small stake; outside blockholders and institutional investors do not affect it. A weak internal governance is associated with a low turnover rate. It seems that recent innovations on financial market regulation are associated with a lower ceo turnover rate with no effect on the ceo turnover-performance relation.

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Article provided by GDE (Giornale degli Economisti e Annali di Economia), Bocconi University in its journal Giornale degli Economisti e Annali di Economia.

Volume (Year): 65 (2006)
Issue (Month): 2 (November)
Pages: 127-154
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Handle: RePEc:gde:journl:gde_v65_n2_p127-154

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Related research
Keywords: CEO turnover; performance; Italian financial market; regulation;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
G15 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - International Financial Markets
G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Stijn Claessens & Simeon Djankov & Joseph P. H. Fan & Larry H. P. Lang, 2002. "Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 57(6), pages 2741-2771, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Doidge, Craig & Karolyi, G. Andrew & Stulz, Rene M., 2004. "Why are foreign firms listed in the U.S. worth more?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 205-238, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Denis, David J. & Denis, Diane K., 1994. "Majority owner-managers and organizational efficiency," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 91-118, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Michael S. Gibson, 1999. "Is corporate governance ineffective in emerging markets?," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 1999-63, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.). [Downloadable!]
  5. Volpin, Paolo, 2002. "Governance with Poor Investor Protection: Evidence from Top Executive Turnover in Italy," CEPR Discussion Papers 3229, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Franks, Julian R & Mayer, Colin & Renneboog, Luc, 2001. "Who Disciplines Management in Poorly Performing Companies?," CEPR Discussion Papers 2949, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Baek, Jae-Seung & Kang, Jun-Koo & Suh Park, Kyung, 2004. "Corporate governance and firm value: evidence from the Korean financial crisis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 265-313, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Steven N Kaplan, 1994. "Top Executives, Turnover and Firm Performance in Germany," CEPR Financial Markets Paper 0045, European Science Foundation Network in Financial Markets, c/o C.E.P.R, 53--56 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DG.
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  9. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1998. "Law and Finance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(6), pages 1113-1155, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  10. Kang, Jun-Koo & Shivdasani, Anil, 1995. "Firm performance, corporate governance, and top executive turnover in Japan," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 29-58, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Jay Dahya & John J. McConnell & Nickolaos G. Travlos, 2002. "The Cadbury Committee, Corporate Performance, and Top Management Turnover," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 57(1), pages 461-483, 02. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Volpin, Paolo F., 2002. "Governance with poor investor protection: evidence from top executive turnover in Italy," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 61-90, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Renneboog, L.D.R. & Trojanowski, G., 2002. "The managerial labor market and the governance role of shareholder control structures in the UK," Discussion Paper 68, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  14. Brunello, Giorgio & Graziano, Clara & Parigi, Bruno M., 2003. "CEO turnover in insider-dominated boards: The Italian case," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 27(6), pages 1027-1051, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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