Alessio De Vincenzo () (Bank of Italy) Claudio Doria () (Bank of Italy) Carmelo Salleo () (Bank of Italy)
Abstract
Bank takeovers result on average in little improvements in performance. This may be due to conflicting driving forces behind them; however these have seldom been studied. We study directly the motivations for bank acquisitions by analyzing the prices paid for them, under the assumption that bankers are willing to pay for what they want. We find that there is no evidence that bankers are ready to pay for possible economies of scale and scope; on the other hand buyers expect to transfer their superior managerial skills to targets. Market power seems to hold little value while entry (or diversification) commands a premium. Agency issues at the buyer are also an important motivation for takeovers: other things being equal acquirers with more free capital are willing to pay more.
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Volume (Year): 64 (2005) Issue (Month): 4 (December) Pages: 327-358 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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Handle: RePEc:gde:journl:gde_v64_n4_p327-358
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Find related papers by JEL classification: G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Mortgages G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance L21 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Business Objectives of the Firm
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Douglas W. Diamond & Raghuram G. Rajan, 2000.
"A Theory of Bank Capital,"
Journal of Finance,
American Finance Association, vol. 55(6), pages 2431-2465, December.
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Douglas W. Diamond & Raghuram G. Rajan, .
"A Theory of Bank Capital,"
CRSP working papers
363, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
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