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Partial Cooperative Equilibria: Existence and Characterization

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Author Info

  • Sylvain Béal

    ()
    (CRESE, Université de Franche-Comté, 30, Avenue de l’Observatoire, 25009 Besançon, France)

  • Subhadip Chakrabarti

    (School of Management and Economics, Queen’s University Belfast, 25, University Square, Belfast BT7 1NN, Northern Ireland, UK)

  • Amandine Ghintran

    (Keleti Faculty of Economics, Obuda University, Tavaszmezo 15-17, H-1084 Budapest, Hungary)

  • Philippe Solal

    (GATE Lyon Saint-Etienne, Université de Saint-Etienne, 6, rue basse des rives, 42023 Saint-Etienne, France)

Abstract

We study the solution concepts of partial cooperative Cournot-Nash equilibria and partial cooperative Stackelberg equilibria. The partial cooperative Cournot-Nash equilibrium is axiomatically characterized by using notions of rationality, consistency and converse consistency with regard to reduced games. We also establish sufficient conditions for which partial cooperative Cournot-Nash equilibria and partial cooperative Stackelberg equilibria exist in supermodular games. Finally, we provide an application to strategic network formation where such solution concepts may be useful.

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File URL: http://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/1/3/338/pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by MDPI, Open Access Journal in its journal Games.

Volume (Year): 1 (2010)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
Pages: 338-356

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Handle: RePEc:gam:jgames:v:1:y:2010:i:3:p:338-356:d:9657

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Related research

Keywords: partial cooperative equilibrium; supermodular games; network formation;

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  1. d'ASPREMONT, Claude & JACQUEMIN, Alexis & GABSZEWICZ, Jean J. & WEYMARK, John A., . "On the stability of collusive price leadership," CORE Discussion Papers RP -522, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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