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The Efficiency of Equity-Linked Compensation: Understanding the Full Cost of Awarding Executive Stock Options

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Author Info
Lisa Meulbroek
Abstract

To properly align incentives using equity-linked compensation, the firm’s managers must be exposed to firm-specific risks, but this forced concentrated exposure prevents the manager from optimal portfolio diversification. Because undiversified managers are exposed to the firm’s total risk, but rewarded (through expected returns) for only the systematic portion of that risk, managers will value stock or option-based compensation at less than its market value. This paper derives a method to measure this deadweight cost, which empirically can be quite large: managers at the average NYSE firm who have their entire wealth invested in the firm value their options at 70% of their market value, while undiversified managers at rapidly growing, entrepreneurially-based firms, such as Internet-based firms, value their option-based compensation at only 53% of its cost to the firm. These estimates prompt questions of whether compensation plans in such firms are weighted too heavily towards incentive-alignment to be cost effective.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Financial Management Association in its journal Financial Management.

Volume (Year): 30 (2001)
Issue (Month): 2 (Summer)
Pages:
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Handle: RePEc:fma:fmanag:meulbroek

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  1. Jenter, Dirk, 2004. "Executive Compensation, Incentives, and Risk," Working papers 4466-02, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Robert M. Gillenkirch & Markus C. Arnold, 2002. "Stock Options as Incentive Contract and Dividend Policy," Working Paper Series: Finance and Accounting 89, Department of Finance, Goethe University Frankfurt am Main. [Downloadable!]
  3. Thierry Poulain-Rehm, 2003. "Stock-options, décisions financières des dirigeants et création de valeur de l'entreprise:le cas français," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, Editions Economica, vol. 6(3), pages 79-116, September. [Downloadable!]
  4. Ulrike Malmendier & Geoffrey Tate, 2004. "CEO Overconfidence and Corporate Investment," NBER Working Papers 10807, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Rosenberg, Matts, 2003. "Stock Option Compensation in Finland: An Analysis of Economic Determinants, Contracting Frequency, and Design," Working Papers 496, Swedish School of Economics and Business Administration. [Downloadable!]
  6. Kyriacou, Kyriacos & Luintel, Kul B & Mase, Bryan, 2008. "Private Information in Executives' Option Trades: Evidence from the UK," Cardiff Economics Working Papers E2008/4, Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section. [Downloadable!]
  7. Samuel Weaver & J. Weston, 2003. "A Unifying Theory of Value Based Management," University of California at Los Angeles, Anderson Graduate School of Management 1037, Anderson Graduate School of Management, UCLA. [Downloadable!]
  8. Vicky Henderson, 2002. "Stock Based Compensation: Firm-specific risk, Efficiency and Incentives," OFRC Working Papers Series 2002fe01, Oxford Financial Research Centre. [Downloadable!]
  9. Christopher Armstrong & David Larcker & Che-Lin Su, 2007. "Stock Options and Chief Executive Compensation," Discussion Papers 1447, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  10. Robert Parrino & Allen M. Poteshman & Michael S. Weisbach, 2002. "Measuring Investment Distortions when Risk-Averse Managers Decide Whether to Undertake Risky Projects," NBER Working Papers 8763, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  11. Nittai K. Bergman & Dirk Jenter, 2005. "Employee Sentiment and Stock Option Compensation," NBER Working Papers 11409, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  12. Brian J. Hall & Thomas A. Knox, 2002. "Managing Option Fragility," NBER Working Papers 9059, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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